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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2458 
CITY OF RICHMOND, Petitioner~ 
vers'Us 
H. T. EUBANK, Respondent. 
PETITiiON FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND BRIE·], IN . 
SUPPORT THE,REOF. 
To the Honorable Chief Justwe and Associate Jitstices of thP 
Bitpreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, the City of Richmond, respectfully shows 
unto this Honorable Court that it is aggrieved by a judgment 
of the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond entered on 
the 19th day of November, 1940, whereby H. T. Eubank wa~ 
exonerated from the J?ayment of $109.32 of the 1940 City 
sewer tax assessed agamst him, and the City of Richmond was 
ordered to refund to the said H. T. Eubank $218.64, represent.-
in~ the 1938 and 1939 City sewer taxes assessed against and 
paid by him (Tr., pp. 7-9) to which order and judgment the? 
·City of Richmond duly excepted as appears from the certifi. 
cate of the Hustings Court duly executed on the 15th day of 
January, 1941. 
----
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*PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 
On November 19, 1940, the Honorable Richard T. Wilson, 
Judge of the Hustings Court qf the City of Petersburg, pre-
siding· for the Judge of the Hustings Court of the City of 
Richmond, entered an order in the latter court directing the 
City of Richmond to refund $21R64 of 1938 and 1~39 sewer 
taxes assessed by the City of Richmond against H. T. Eubank 
and exonerating H. T. Euban~ from the payment of $109.32 
of such taxes for the year 1940, to which order the City duly 
excepted (Tr., p. 8). 
The City of Richmond concedes the correctness of the. order 
in so far as it relates to the 1939 and 1940 assessments, upon 
the authority of the decision of this Court in Southern Rail-
way Company v. City of Rich1nond, 175 Va. 308, but the que~-
tion of the statute of limitations affects the number of year::; 
of taxes that may be refunded and this question was not de-
cided in the Southern Railway case or in a1i'y' other case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
There is no controversy as to the facts and we believe we 
h,ve fairly stated the facts as follows: . 
/. In 1937 the City of Richmond took advantage of the 1936 
Enablin$ 4ct of the General Asse~bly and c~eat~d i~s :Board 
of tiieal Estate Ass~ssors. This B~ard annually assesses 
3* real *estate in the City with local levies thereon and has 
also taken over the duty of putting upon the land books 
of the City the City sewer tax of ten cents per front foot of 
each lot that uses the City sewer. Prior to the decision of 
the Southern Railway case, siipra.,. the Board ass~ssed such 
sewer tax with respect to every lot that abutted upcm~ a st~eet 
in which the sewer was located, regardless of whether or not 
such lot actually used the sewer. Afte~ that q.e~ision was 
rendered, the Board checked all the lots and cancelled the 
l.940 assessments with respect to such lots as did not actua1rly 
pse the sewer, a~d marked as uncollectible all of"tlie unp~icl 
items for the years prior to 1940 that were void because of ffie 
~outhern Railway decision. ~uch o·f those ta~es as ,vere paid 
with respect to lots thi~.t did not use the sewe1~ and ·as were 
assessed for the year 19~9 are· being refunded with the con-
seµt of the City upon petitions filed in the courts, but the City 
has not ·consented to the refund of any 1938 assessments. 
H: T. Eubank was assessed bv this ·Board with the i938 and 
1939 sewer taxes on account of certain lots and sucl1 taxes 
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have been paid to the City. The taxpayer's lots in question 
did not actually use the City sewer. 
The Board of Real Estate Assessors does not determine 
the rate of the levy for real estate tax purposes, but does 
determine the value of the real estate upon the basis of which 
values the levy of the ad -valorem. property tax is applied. 
4* · *The 1938 and 1939 taxes complained of by the tax-
payer represent the charge of ten cents per front foot 
of eaeh lot of land abutting on a -City sewer, which charge 
was made by the City of Richmond, and by virtue of the lack 
of any actual use of the sewer and the decision in the South-
ern Railway case, the counsel for the City concede that each 
assessment for each year was erroneous and unconstit11tional. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. 
I. 
The Court erred in holding that the 1938 sewer tax should 
be refunded by the City of Richmond. 
II. 
The Court erred in holding that the sewer tax was a tb.x 
upon real estate. 
III. 
The Court erred in holding that the statute of limitations 
prescribed a two-year limit with respect to the refund. 
/ 
These three assignments are so correlated that it is con-
venient to argue them all together. 
THE QUESTIONS OF LA vV INVOLVED. 
Do the statutes of limitations forbid the refund of the 1938 
assessments 1 
4a* *THE POSITlO.N OF ,'!1HE CITY. 
1. The City takes the position that the assessments are 
"licensed taxes", governed by the one-year limitation as to 
license taxes in section 414 of the Tax Code of Virginia; and 
2. That if the assessments are not license taxes but real 
estate taxes, they are g·overned by the one year limitation in 
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chapter 261, Acts of Assembly of 1936, and not by the two 
year limitation in section 414 of the Tax Code of Virginia 
as to local taxes on real estate; and 
3. That under either view the application filed in the Hust-
ings Court was too late to support the refund of the 1938 
items. 
THE PiOSITION OF THE TAXPAYER. 
The taxpayer contends that the tax is a real estate prop-
erty tax (Tr., p. 46) and that Section 414 of the Tax Code 
of Virgi.nia is the only law that is applicable; that the plain 
limitation in that law with respect to a real estate property 
tax is two years; and that his application was within the two 
year limitation as to the 1938 .tax. 
It is argued by counsel for the taxpayer that the tax is 
5"" a burden upon real estate, collected just as real *estate 
taxes are collected, imposed upon the real estate itself, 
and made a lien upon the real estate; that the Enabling A.ct 
and the ordinance enacted pursuant thereto authorized only 
the assessment of the fair market ~alue of real estate and 
did not embrace an assessment of a sewer tax; that the au-
thority in the Enabling A.ct for any person aggrieved by any 
such assessment to apply for relief within one year relates 
only to the valuation of the real estate (Tr., pp. 57-58). 
THE PRIMA.RY PROBLEM IS ONE OF CLASSIFICA-
TION OF THE SEWER TAX. 
It is obvious from the statement of the question of law in-
volved and the position of the City that the primary problem 
before the court is one of classification of the tax complained 
of. What is the character of the tax¥ Is it a license tax or 
a tax upon real estate? 
Let us make our position clear in this respect. In no way 
do we assert the tax in question to be a business license tax. 
but a license tax is not necessarily a tax on a privilege o·f 
eng·aging in a business. There are many license taxes other 
than the business license taxes which are specifically author-
ized in our Charter such as license taxes on automobiles, 
trucks, drays and other vehicles (See .Section 63 of the CitY 
Charter found in the Acts of 1926, pages 533, 573). The tax-
payers in such cases need not be engaged in any business. We 
are not dependent upon that portion of t]1e City Charter found 
in Section 62 as amended by the Acts of 1938 at pag-e 
6* 535. That portion of ~the City Charter authorizes li-
cense taxes upon any business which cannot be reached 
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by the ad valorem system. We have specific authority for the 
sewer tax in Section 170 of the Virginia Constitution, which 
authorizes the levy of such a tax "for the use of sewers". 
STATUTES INViOLVED. 
(a) As to the Character of the Tax. 
The basic authority for the assessment complained of is 
Section 170 of the Constitution of Virginia which is in part 
as follows: 
'' * ~ * No city or town or county having· the right, under 
this section, to impose taxes or assessments for local improve-
ments upon abutting property owners shall impose any tax or 
assessment upon abutting landowners for street or other pub-
lic improvements except * * * for either the construction, or 
for the use of sewers; and the same when imposed, shall not 
be in excess of the peculiar benefits resulting therefrom to 
such abutting landow,n,ers. Except in cities and towns and 
counties having a population greater than five hundred in-
habitants per square mile, as shown by the United States 
census, no taxes or assessments, for local public improve-
ments, shall be imposed on abutting landowners." 
The 1938 amendment of Section 19i of the Charter of the 
City of Richmond, Acts of 1938, page 534, provides that in 
lieu of the assessment for the expense of construction of sew-
ers the City "may assess and collect cornpensation for the 
use of sewers * * * ". Under Section 20, Chapter 11, of 
7* the Richmond City Code of 1937, *pages 198-9, the Rich-
mond ,City Ordinance directs that there shall be annually 
paid to the City '' as compensation for the privilege of using 
a sewer, a sum equal to ten cents per front foot" of eacl1 
lot that abuts upon a street in which there is a sewer. 
The Richmond sewer tax is not absolutely unique. There 
are other similar charges and the consideration of these 
other charges and the methods of assessing them is helpful in 
determining the character of the group as a whole, and th(} 
sewer tax in particular. 
Some of the other local assessments or charge~ that arP 
similar to the '' sewer taxes'' are those prescribed by SectionR 
7, 8, 9 and 10 of Chapter 11 of the City Code, pages 188-191. 
These are such assessments as the char~es for the occupation 
of portions of the streets by '' areas, vaults, entrances to base-
ments or cellars, balconies, bay-windows • * * "; ''rental 
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charge for gasoline pumps or oil wells located on the side-
walks or streets of the City"; the rental charge "for the 
privilege of maintaining electrical or other permanent sig'l1s 
which project six inches or more over streets''; the rental 
charge against persons owning showcases, fruit stands or 
other like obstructions in the streets. These come right along 
in Section 7 of Chapter 11 (page 188) with charges which are 
assessed against property owners annually for the privilege 
of connecting with and using sewers and all of them, includ-
ing the sewer tax, are directed to be charged against eacI1 
8* owner upon suitable books to be kept for *the purpose iu 
the office of the Clerk of Special Assessments. The samt ... 
section provides that the sewer charge shall be a lien upon 
the real estate and shall be added to the tax bill; but by Sec-
tions 8 and 10 of that Chapter the charges relating to things 
other than sewers and signs are simply directed to be charged 
upon the land books and collected and accounted for in the 
manner prescribed for the collection of City taxes. There 
is no lien upon the land specifically prescribed by ordinance 
with respect to any of the special assessments or charges ex-
cept the sewer tax assessments. The sign bills are handled 
under authority of Section 9 witI10ut being placed upon the 
land books. 
All of the various kinds of taxes prescribed by the sections 
of Chapter 11 referred to above are taxes for the privilege 
of using some portion of the streets. 
In 1936 the General Assembly enacted a law authorizing 
cities of more than 175,000 to create a permanent Board of. 
Real Estate Assessors for the annual assessment of real es-
tate. This 1936 Enabling Act of the General Assembly (Acts 
of 1936, page 440) and hereinafter ref erred to as the Enabling 
Act, provides that all of the powers and duties of the ·Com-
missioner of the Revenue with respect to making up tbe land 
books are transferred to and devolved upon the Board of Real 
Estate Assessors. The Act is comparatively short and it is 
as follows: 
"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia: 
9* s, '1. That in cities containing more tllan one hundred 
and seventy-five thousand inhabitants, according to the 
last preceding United States census, the council or other gov-
erning body of such cities, may in lieu of the method now pre-
scribed by Jaw, provide for the annual assessment of real 
estate for local taxation, and to that end, may elect one or 
more persons to assess such real estate for taxation, and the 
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council or other governing body in such cities may prescribe 
the duties of such person or persons and fix his or their com-
pensation, which shall be paid out of the local treasury; and 
such council or other governing body may likewise provide 
for such clerical assistants and other expenses that may be 
properly incident thereto. 
'' 2. All duties now de':olved upon the commissioner of reve-
nue with respect to the assessment of real estate and making 
up the land books in such cities, shall be transferred to and 
devolved upon the assessor or assessors to be appointed pur-
suant to this act. All such real estate shall be assessed at its 
fair market value, and taxes for each year on such real estafo 
shall be extended by such assessor or assessors on the basis 
of the last assessment made prior to such year, subJect to 
such changes as may have been lawfully made. 
'' 3. Any person or any such c-ity aggrieved by any such 
assessnient, may apply for relief to the hu .. c;tings or corpora-
l.non co'U,rts of such city, within one year from, the thirty-first 
day of December of the year in wh-ich such assessment is made, 
and the procedure in sitch cases shall be 'l!n the 1nanner pre-
scribed by section four hundred and foiirteen of the .Tax Code 
of Virginia. 
''4. This act shall not apply to the assessment of any real 
estate assessable under the law by the State Corporation Com-
mission. 
'' 5. The act entitled 'An act to provide for the assessment 
and the equalization of the assessment of real estate in cities 
containing more than one hundred and seventy thousand in-
habitants,' approved March tenth, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-two, and all provisions of law relating to the equaliza. 
tion of real estate assessments insofar as the same are ap-
plicable in cities containing more than one hundred and seY-
enty-five thousand inhabitants according- to the last prececl 
ing United States census are hereby repealed. and all other 
acts or parts of acts in conflict with this act, are to the extent 
of such conflict, hereby repealed)) 
_,./'. 
9a * *Pursuant to this Enabling Act, the Council of the 
City of Richmond adopted an ordinance approved Au-
gust 5, 1937, the title of which was as follow~: 
'' To provide for the assessment of real estate in the City 
of Richmond in the year 1.938 and each year thereafter ; to 
provide for the equalization of such assessment; to proviclP 
for the election of three assessors and to prescribe their dutiei:: 
and fix their compensation; and to provide for the appoint-
8 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
ment of such assistants and other clerical force as may be 
necessary.'' 
Sections 7, 8 and 9 of that ordinance are as follows: 
''7. That all the duties now devolved upon the Commis-
sioner of Revenue with respect to the assessment of real es-
tate in the City of Richmond, shall be transferred to, per-
formed by and devolved upon the assessors herein provided 
for and the Commissioner of Revenue is hereby authorized 
and directed to deliver to the assessors herein provided for, 
as soon as practicable after the first day of September, 1937, 
all books and other records relating to all former assessments 
of real estate. 
"8. That the duties of the Bureau of Liens now under the 
control and direction of the Comptroller of the City of Rich~ 
mond, be and the same are hereby transferred to said asses-
sors, together with all books, maps, records and other detailed 
information therein contained. 
''9. That the duties of the clerk of Special Assessments, 
now under the control and direction of the Comptroller of 
the City of Richmond, be and the same are hereby transferred 
to the said assessors, together with all records pertaining to 
said office.'' 
10* ~(b) As to the Statit,tes of Lirnitations. 
Section 414 of the Tax Code of Virginia gives to the courts 
the jurisdiction to correct erroneous assessments of local levies 
generally. It provides in part as follows: 
'' Any person assessed with co1vnty or city levies or other 
local taxes, on real estate, aggrieved by any such assessment, 
may, unless otherwise specially provided by law, within two 
vears from the thirty-first day of December of the year in 
which any such assessment is made, and any person assessed 
with • • * a local license tax, aggrieved thereby, may, 'Witlvi,n* . 
one year from the 31st day of December of the year in w·hich 
\ such assessment is made, apply for relief to the circuit court 
\
of the county, or any city court of record of the city, wherein 
such assessment was made. * • * '' 
The 1936 EnahlinQ,' Act does two separate things. It au-
thorizes the council to '' provide for the annual assessment of 
real estate £01· local taxes'' and also transfers all duties with 
respect to '' making up the land books'' from the commissioner 
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of revenue to such board of real estate assessors as is ap-
pointed under that Act. As far as the "assessment of real 
estate'' is concerned, as distinguished from the assessment of 
a use, privilege, or license tax in connection with sewers, the 
law directs in section 2 that '' all such real estate shall be 
assessed at its fair market value". The assessment in ques-
tion here is not made according to fair market value. The 
1936 Act did nothing with respect to the assessment of sewer 
taxes. ·The power to assess such taxes still rests in the coun-
cil under section 170 of the *Constitution. The Legisla-
n • ture did not attempt to make any change in that method 
when it enacted the 1936 Act relating to boards of as-
sessors. 
The limitation of time in the Enabling Act is one year as 
found in section 3, but the procedure is the same as that in 
section 414 of the Tax Code. Section 5 of the 1936 Act re-
peals '' all other acts or parts of acts in conflict with'' the 1936 
Act, to the extent of such conflict; and if the tax is a tax on 
real estate, then the Enabling Act repeals that portion of 
section 414 of the Tax Code insofar as the latter fixes a two 
year limit upon refunds of real estate taxes. 
ARGUMENT. 
I. Upon Reason a.n.d Principle. 
(a) As to the Character of the Tax. 
It certainly must he conceded that the tax is either a "li-
cense'' tax or a "local tax on real estate". These are the 
only general categories referred to in section 414 of the Tax 
Code that can have any possible application to the tax in 
question. 
Counsel for the City respectfully assert that the tax is no1 
a. tax '' on real estate'' because it is in no sense assessed on 
the fair market value of the real estate; it cannot be assessed 
just because the real estate exists in the City and it can be 
assessed only when the privilege has been granted by the City 
and exercised or enjoyed by the taxpayer. 
The particular assessment~ complained of by the taxpayer 
are conceded by the City to have been erroneous and, 
12* *but for the lapse of time, the City would consent to 
the refund of the 1938 as well as the 1939 items. We 
take the position, however, that the taxpayer might have been 
as careful and prompt. to conceive the error in the City's tax 
ns was the Southern Railway Company, a.nd he might have 
filed his application in time to obtain the refund of the 1938 
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items. He did not do so and the City leans upon the statutes 
of limitations ·set up as limitations upon the right, not simply 
limitations upon the remedy, for the prote-cti.on. of the City~ 
The point is, nevertheless,. that the· taxpayer says the limit 
is two years instead of one: year as clafaned. by the City; that 
the: application is within the: two year limitation is likewise 
conceded by the City, yet we' say tlre correct limitation is one 
year .. 
Tne determination of the'. character of th~ tax goes far to-
ward settling the question. Certainly, if the tax is a license 
tax and not a tax oil real estate, the· limitation is one year 
under section 414 of the Tax Code, for the all sufficient rea-
s·on that" section 414 of the· T'ax: Code is the only statute ap-
fo,li.cabie to th. e ~orre·ction o~ lic.enses. and its li.·mitation as to ice.uses is plainly ai1d deiinifaly one yea:r. 
· If the ta.x is a tax on real estate and not a license tax, then 
the limitation is still one year; if the· 1936' Enabling Act ap-
plies, but two years H s-ectfon 414 of the T'a.x Code applies fo 
the proc~eding. 
•First then, let us consider the character of the tax-
ig• whether ft is a license tax or a tax on real estate. 
tr pon reason and principle, a license tax is a tax or 
~harge made for, oil account of, or as a prerequisite to the en-
joyment of a pennissioii t~ do. ~ome .act that the public gen-
eraJly i_s not perm~tted to do without i~curring the liability of' 
a like tax. . It is important to nqte that the payment of the 
sewer tax is ~10t ma,;Ie a prerequisite of the right to use the 
sewer. ~ut the liCJ,bi~ity arises upo~ the use of the sewer and 
thf City looks to the li~n on the !and and the usual method for 
collecting and ac~ounting t:or Ci.ty taxes ~generally as a suffi-
cient assuran~~ that the City will be paid the amount of the 
charge. T,-ie lien on the la~d is only on~ more bit of security 
for extending crecJit to the Iicerts'ee, but the ctea.tion of the lien 
do~s not change the_ cha racte~· of the tax. 
The owner of real estate who 'Uses the sewer is liable for the 
tax. The owner of teal estate who does not use the sewer is 
not Hab.le for the tax. The distinguishing characteristic be-
tween liability and non-liability is the use of' the sewer. If 
the sewer :is used, the tax ari·ses. The tax cannot be upon or 
oii ~ccount of anything except the use of the sewer. The use 
or the sewer is the exercise or a privilege or the enjoyment of 
a li~ens~. The ta~ is, there(ore, a tax on a license or a '' license 
t~x '' .. Being_ a licetil?e. tax, tl}e only authority for the correc-
tion thereof. is found in secti~m 414 of the Tax Code, which 
prescribes a one year !imitation upon the very *right 
14e itself, and the ta)rpayer 1s too late as to the 1938 items. 
When a lot owner uses the City sewer, he thereby and 
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thereupon incurs liability for the tax and no such tax can b~ 
levied until there is actual use of the sewer. In the brief 
filed in the lower court, counsel for the taxpayer pointed out 
that the City Code authorized the City to compel one w"l10 
owns lots with occupied houses upoh them to use the City 
sewers, where available. rrhese sections of the City Code do 
not compel the property owner to incur liability for the 10c 
a foot charge which is here involved. The Code provisions so 
relied upon by taxpayer's counsel are found in section 24 of 
Chapter 25, of the Richmond City Code of 1937, page 354. 
rrhis section relates to the owner of lots with "occu,pied" 
houses on them. If the house is occupied, then the City may, 
for sanitary reasons, compel the occupied house to be con-
nected with and to actually use the City sewer, hut the occu-
pancy cannot he compelled, a.nd it is the occupancy that is the 
basis for the compulsory use and, therefore, the compulsory 
charge. This is another way of saying that the voluntary oc-
cupation of a building is the basis for the compulsory use of 
the sewer. If the sewer taxes are abolished the compulsory 
use may continue. If the compulsory use be abolished the tax 
may continue, providing actual use exists. The compulsory 
use is a sanitary measure. The tax of 10c per foot is a rev-
enue measure based on the voluntary exercise of a privilege. 
The City does say: '' If a. lot makes any use at all of a sewer, 
it must use the City sewer where one is available.'' The City 
does not say: '' The lot owner must use the City sewer.'' 
15* *The compulsory use is conditioned upon a voluntary 
act of the lot owner, namely: occupancy of a house on 
the lot. 
Then too, the tax cannot he a tax on real estate for the rea-
son that the Constitution provides that real estate shall be 
assessed at the fair market value. (See section 169 of Vir-
ginia Constitution.) The value of the real estate is in no way 
connected with the assessment of the Citv sewer tax. A valid 
assessment of a. City sewer tax is not in any degree based upon· 
value. Such an assessment lacks that essential element in 
order for it to be classified as a tax on real estate. The basis 
for the assessment is the exercise of a privilege and this is 
characteristic of a license tax. ·without the exercise of the 
privilege, the enjovrnent of the license, no tax is assessable. 
If the license is enjoyed, the tax is assessable. The tax is not 
assessable ber~use of the ownership of property. Property 
is owned by this taxpayer, but everyone must concede that the 
tax is not and was not assessable because of the ownership or 
the existence of the property. It is in no sense assessable ac-
cording to the fair market value or any other value of real 
estate. 
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(b) As to the Limitation of Time. 
The limitation as to time is prescribed by statute and in-
volves almost entirely a construction of statutes without any 
basic reason or principle as a helpful aid in ascertai~ing the 
legislative intent. Section 414 of the Tax Code plainly 
168 *prescribes a one year limit for license taxes, and a two 
year limit for local taxes on real estate. The only con-
ceivable reason why there should be a limitation of two years 
for the correction of a real estate tax and only one year for 
the correction of a license tax is that license taxes generally 
are payable in the beginning of the year and real estate taxes 
are payable at the end of the year. A license tax assessable 
and payable in January, 1938, might have been corrected by 
an application filed as late as December 31, 1939, almost two 
years after it was payable. A real estate tax assessable in Jan-
uary, 1938, was payable without penalty as to the last half in 
December, 1938, and might have been corrected by an applica-
tion filed as late as December 31, 1940, two years after its 
last half was payable. In the case of relief with respect to 
license taxes and real estate taxes in the State at large rather 
than in the City of Richmond, an application may be filed as 
late as two years after the tax is payable. This evidently did 
not appeal to the City of Richmond as a valid reason for such a 
distinction, and the City procured the enactment of the 1936 
Enabling Act whereby the limitation as to Richmohd real 
estate assessments was cut down to one year. Now, in Rich-
mond, license taxes generally and real estate taxes are on the 
same footing and each may be corrected if the application be 
filed ,:vithin one year. Certainly, there can be found no valid 
reason why the correction of taxes on licenses generally and 
on real estate must be sought within one year and yet 
17* sewer taxes be corrected as late as two •years. Why 
create a third and distinct category, namely, sewer 
taxes? They are put on real estate bills, payable and collec-
tible along with and in the same manner as real estate taxes 
and they should be corrected in the same manner as real estate 
taxes if they are to be put into the same category as real es-
tate taxes. It seems to be a fair deduction that when the 
Legislature authorized the creation of a Board of Real Estate 
Assessors '' for the annual assessment of real estate for local 
taxation", and itself transferred to such Board as was ap-
pointed pursuant to that act, the duties formerly devolved 
upon the Commissioner of the Revenue "with respect to the 
assessment of real estate and making up the land books", it 
considered that it had transferred all duties and powers with 
respect to the assessment of all kinds of local taxes on real 
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estate; that when it prescribed a limitation of one year for 
any person "aggrieved by any such assessment", it did not 
intend that a real estate property tax be corrected within one 
year and a sewer tax be corrected within two years under sec-
tion 414 simply because that was a levy or other local tax on 
real estate different from an '' assessment of real estate for 
local taxation'' under the Enabling Act. Each charge,-the 
ad valorem tax on real estate and tl1e 10c per front foot tax-
is a levy or a tax, and there is no difference between the two 
words " ta..x" and "levy". See section 434 of the Tax Code 
which is as follows : 
is• ""''In the construction of the Tax Code of Virginia and 
all tax and revenue statutes, the word 'taxes' shall in-
clude 'levies', and the word 'levies' shall include 'taxes'.'' 
Each of these charges, whether the ad valorem, property tax 
or the sewer tax, must be assessed, and when each has been 
assessed, each becomes an assessment of a local levy or local 
tax. 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the assessments 
are not license taxes, but assessments upon real estate. Then 
the items can be corrected only by virtue of the 1936 Enabling 
Act, which prescribes a one year limitation. The 1936 Act 
transferred to the Board of Real Estate Assessors all duties 
then devolved upon the Commissioner of Revenue with respect 
to the assessment of real estate and making up the land books. 
It did not transfer only the duties with respect to the appraisal 
of land for tax purposes. All duties with respect to the assess-
ment of real estate were transferred. If the tax in question 
is a tax or assessment upon real estate, then all duties with 
respc~ct thereto were transferred to the Board and in the next 
section of the Act it is provided that any person aggrieved bv 
a'l'll!J su,eh (t,SSessment may apply within one year and the pro-
cedure shall be as theretofore, namely, under section 414 of the 
Tax Code. The point here is that if the assessment is a real 
estate assessment, the duty with respect to it was transferred 
to the Board and relief from '' any such assessment'' must be 
sought withiIJ the one year period. The relief is not limited 
to the erroneous appraisal of fair market value. (See sections 
2 and 3 of the Enabling Act, page 9, supra.) 
•The 1936 Act took away from the Commissioner of 
19"" the Revenue all duties with respect to the assessment 
of real estate and, therefore, left with him no power or 
duty to make any assessment on real estate. If the tax was, 
in character, a. real estate assessment before the 1936 Act, it 
remained in that character after the Act, but the duty to make 
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the assessment was transferred to the Board. Any such as-
sessment as was transferred from the Commissioner of the 
Revenue to the Board became subject to correction under the 
1936 Act upon an application filed within one year. The for-
mer two year limitation under section 414 of the Tax Code 
conflicts with the 1936 Act and, by the terms of the 1936 Act, 
section 414 is to that extent repealed. The right to proceed 
under section 414 as to assessments of Richmond taxes on real 
estate has been repealed and such right now lies under the 
1936 Act. The right exists only for one year. The taxpayer 
failed to exercise it within one year and has lost that right. 
The point is that assuming the sewer tax to be a '' levy or 
local tax on real estate'', then as far as Richmond sewer taxes 
are concerned, they are controlled by the Enabling Act and 
the one year rule governs; that as far as assessments of sewe1· 
levies or taxes in Cities containing not niore than 175,000 
inhabitants are concerned, Section 414 of the Tax Code gov-
erns, and being, by assumption a local tax on real estate, that 
section fixes the limitation at two years in other jurisdictions. 
"\Ve respectfully contend, however, tlmt the Richmond sewer 
tax is a license tax, but if it is a tax on real estate then the 
limitation of time is one year under the 1936 Enabling Act. 
20* :err. Upon .A:u,thorities. 
(a) As to the Character of the Tax. 
We respectfully assert that this Court has settled all pre-
existing doubt as to the character of our sewer tax and has 
alreadv declared the character of the Richmond sewer ta."C 
to be a use tax, a tax upon the exercise of a privilege and, 
the ref ore, a license tax. 
The Southern Ra,ilway Case Controls the Character 
of the Tax. 
At 175 Va. 314, the Court said this : 
'' The assessment, in order to be valid, must be imposed 
P-ither for the construction of sewers or for the use of sewers". 
(The italics w·as by the Court). 
"The City concedes that the assessments imposed in this 
instance are not assessments for the payment of the cost of 
construction of sewers.'' 
The Court then discussed the meaning of the word ''use'' 
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and decided that it did not mean privilege of using, but said: 
"'Use' is the exercise of the privilege'' and tha.t all consid-
erations "compel the conclusion that the language means 'use 
in fact', or 'actual use' as contradistinguished from 'privilege 
of using' or' available for use' ". 
The tax was held to be based upon the "exercise of a privi-
lege'', in the language of the Court, ':vhich compels the conclu-
sion that it is a "license tax" in the broad sense of that 
phrase. 
21 * *The Virgin,ia Constit?ttion a.nd General Statiites, Text 
1¥riters, and Co'll-rt Decisions Force the Con-
clitsion That the Tax ls a License Tax. 
Section 170 of the Virginia Constitution, ·w·hich authorizes 
the sewer tax, authorizes the assessments to be '' upon abut-
ting property oiv1wrs", not upon abutting property. It pro-
vides that the same, when assessed, "shall not be in excess of 
the peculiar benefits resulting therefrom from the use of the 
sewers to such abutting lnndowners", not to such land. The 
very source of authority impliedly forbids the assessment of 
a tax upon the property and expressly authorizes the assess-
ment of a tax for the use of the se-wers. The tax is against 
the person on account of the exercise of a privilege. 
Some of the distinctions between a license tax and a prop-
erty tax are pointed out by Mr. Cooley in his book on Taxa-
tion, 4th Ed. Vol. 1, sections 42 and 46. In section 42, he in-
dicates that there is not any real difference between an excise 
tax and a license tax. In section 46, he says this: 
'' Generally the term 'excise taxes' is used to distinguish 
such taxes from taxes on property. It is often very impor-
tant to determine whethPr a certain tax is a property tax or an 
excise tax, i. e., whether (1) a property tax or (2) an occupa-
tion, license, business, privilege or franchise tax. * * * ''. 
He thus puts in the same category occupation, license, busi-
ness, privilege and franchise taxes. Again he says in sec-
tion 46: 
'' Another thing to be noted, it has heen said, is that the 
obligation to pay an excise is based upon the voluntary action 
of the person taxed in performing the act, enjoying the privi-
Jege of engaging in the occupation which is the subject of the 
excise, and the element of absolute and unavoidable demand, 
as in the case of a property tax, is lacking.'' 
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22*. 9 As we believe we have shown above, the City sewer 
tax lacks the element of absolute and unavoidable de-
mand that is always present in the assessment of a City prop-
erty tax. The sewer tax is dependent upon the voluntary ac-
tion of the person in performing some act which constitutes 
the enjoyment of the privilege of using the sewer. There is 
no assessment of a sewer tax that is authorized by law unless 
there is an actual use of the sewer by the taxpayer. That ne-
cessity is pointed out by the decision of this Court in the 
Southern Railway case. 
In Hwnton v. Comnionwealth, 166 Va. 229, this Court was 
considering the character of the Virginia State Income Tax. 
It was argued that any tax which affected property in any 
way, directly or indirectly, was a tax on that property. The 
majority opinion upon the final hearing rejected that view and 
in the course of its opinion discussed several taxes which af-
fected property, but which were not property taxes. One of 
these taxes was the Virginia State Inheritance Tax. As to 
this, the Court said, on page 244: 
"We think the fundamental weakness in petitioner's case 
is his theory that any ta.x which affects property in any way, 
directly or indirectly, is a tax on that property. This argu-
ment is not sound and has been expressly repudiated by this 
court. 
"In Com. v. Carter, 126 Va. 469, 102 S. E. 58, and in Cor~ 
nett's Ex'rs. v. Com., 127 Va. 640, 105 S. E. 230, we held that 
an inheritance tax is not a tax upon the property transferred 
from the estate of the decedent to the beneficiary, out a privi-
lege tax. And yet it certainly affects the property trans-
ferred.'' 
23* •section 109 of the Tax Code of Virginia makes the 
Virginia State Inheritance Tax a lien upon all property 
passing under the v"ill or under the laws of Descents and Dis-
tributions ~nd in spite .of that lien the tax is not a property 
tax. The hen for the City sewer tax should not make the City 
sewer tax a property tax. 
In the H'Umton case the late Mr. Justice Epes prepared what 
was at first the majority opinion of the court but which. upon 
the µ:ranting of the rehearing and the decision after the re-
hearing-, became the minority opinion of the court adopted by 
Chief ,Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice Hudgins who dis-
sented from the majority. Mr. Justice Epes argued stren-
uously that there was a distinction between a property tax and 
a. tax upon property and he uncovered an old Act of the Gen-
eral Assembly which imposed a tax as f oilows: "for every 
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stallion or jackass, twice the price at which such stallion or 
jackass covers a mare by the season • • • ''. In his argument 
.appearing at 166 Va. at page 263> he said this: 
"'Vhere the right to do a thing or to have or exercise a right 
or franchise granted by the State is made dependent upon or 
subject to a charge for the doing, ha,ving or exercising of it, 
the tax is a privilege tax. This is true ·whether the tax be 
assessable and/or payable before or after the period for 
which it is exacted, and regardless of the basis upon which it 
is imposed.'' 
This much of his opinion is perfectly sound and we rely upnn 
the principle adopted by him, but he drew therefrom the 
wrong conclusion which was rejected by the court as a whole. 
His erroneous conclusion was as follows : 
24• *"It is not. a p1·operty tax, but it may·be, and often is, 
a taa; upon property. To use· a rather inelegant example 
because it is so excellently exemplified by the Virginia stat-
utes, a tax for a license to stand a specified jackass is plainly 
a. tax upon that jackass." (Italics not supplied.) 
The majority of this Court declined to say that there was a 
difference beh.reen a property tax and a tax upon property. 
The instant tax is a privilege tax and the argument of the 
counsel for the petitioner a.nd the holding of the lower court 
hereinafter discussed that it is a tax upon real estate is as un-
sound as Judge Epes' argument with respect to the tax upon 
the jackass. 
Another illustration of a license tax which is not a prop-
erty tax, although measured by property and in that sense 
based on property, is the tax prescribed by Chapter 113 of 
the Acts of Assembly for 1936 (Acts of 1936, page 188, as 
amended by Acts of 1938, page 427, carried also as section 
194-a in the Tax Code of Virginia, published by the Depart-
ment of Taxation, hut not as such in Michie's Code). In that 
law there is an annual State '' license tax'' assessed against 
police benevolent associations, police pension fund associa-
tions, and firemen's mutnal aid associations based upon and 
g-raduated according to the amount of the taxpayer's intan-
gible personal property and the tax is made in lieu of all State 
taxes which ,vould otherwise be imposed upon the intangible 
property of the taxpayer. These taxes are described in the 
statutes imposing them as *" an annual State licensr: 
25* tax". The associations are not in business and the tax 
is measured by property. Yet the tax is a license tax. 
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Another similar Act is section 12 of an Act approved Feb-
ruary 21, 1920, imposing a license tax on industrial loan as-
sociations and carried as section 181-b of the Tax Code of 
Virginia as compiled by the State Department of Taxation. 
Both of these last two described taxes are license taxes al-
though eaGh is. ~easured solely by property and are made in 
lieu of taxes· o~ property. 
A still stronger illustration of license taxes which are not 
taxes upon property although they are made liens upon prop-
erty are the several license taxes levied under Chapter 16 
of the Tax Code of Virginia against many pulJlic service cor-
porations. By section 216 of the Tax Code of Virginia every 
railway or canal corporation is required to pay to the State 
an annual State franchise tax "for the privilege of exercising 
its franchise in this State". The third from the last para-
graph of that section found on pa.ge 150 of the 1940 edition 
of the Tax Code of Virginia is as follows : '' All the taxes and 
levies shall, until paid, lJe a lien upon the property within this 
State of the corporation owning the same, and take precedence 
of all other liens or encumbrances.'' By the provisions of 
sections 216-a, 216-b and 229, similar franchise taxes are le-vied 
against pipe line transmission corporations, motor bus trans-
portation companies in cities and towns, and water, heat, 
26* ~light and power companies. In each of these cases, the 
taxes are levied against these corporations for the privi-
lege of exercising their franchises in this State and in eacl1 
case the taxes are made a lien upon the corporation's property .. 
There is no doubt whatever that the taxes against such pub-
lic service corporations are license taxes and there is likewise 
no doubt that the taxes are made liens upon the property, for 
the statutes plainly provide that the taxes are privi-
lege taxes and are liens on the property. The Richmond 
sewer tax does not occupy a unique position in being a privi-
lege tax and at the same time being a. lien upon the property .. 
On the contrary it seems to be in accord with the general policy 
of the State with respect to many of its privilege taxes. 
But for the decision in the Southern R.ailway case, there is, 
therefore, ample authority for the view that the City sewer 
tax is a license tax, yet it is submitted that the strongest rea-
son of all for such view is the holding in the Southern Railwav 
case. We again refer the Court to the principles decided ther·e 
and to tl1e plain holding that the tax is assessed upon the privi-
lege of using the sewer. It follows that the one year limita-
tion applicallle to license taxes forbade the Court from grant-
ing the refund of the 1938 items and that a writ of error shoulrl 
be granted .. 
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(b) As to the Limitation of Time. 
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If we assume for the sake of argument only, and without 
meaning in any way to withdraw from our positfon hold-
27* ing to the *license viewpoint, that the tax is a tax on real 
estate, then the problem becomes one of determining 
whether section 414 and the two year limitation therein as 
to real estate taxes or Chapter 261 of the Acts of 1936 and the 
one year limitation therein shall control. 
The counsel for the City respectfully assert that the 1936 
Act controls and that the limitation is one year. 
It cannot be successfully argued that there is any differenct> 
between "taxes'' and "levies". Although section 414 uses 
the word ''levies'' and the 1936 .A.ct uses the word ''taxes'', 
we are governed by section 434 of the Tax Code of Virginia, 
.r;;upra, which provides that in the construction of the Tax Code 
of Virginia. and all tax and revenue statutes, the word ''taxes'' 
shall include ''levies'' and the word ''levies'' shall include 
"taxes". 
No good reason can he conceived for saying that one kind 
of real estate tax shall be assessed by the Board of Real 
Estate Assessors ·and the correction thereof be subject to a 
one year limitation under the 1936 Act, while another kind of 
real estate tax shall he assessed by such Assessment Clerk un-
der the Comptroller of the City of Richmond and the correc-
tion thereof subject to the limitation of two years under sec-
tion 414 of the Tax Code. 
If the questioned tax be a real estate tax different from the 
a.cl valoreni tax on real estate there might be some room to 
argue that the two year limitation in section 414 applies, 
28* but *there is absolutely no basis for making a distinc-
tion between the ad va.lore1n real estate tax and any other 
real estate tax. The City does not have the constitutional 
power to assess two kinds of real estate taxes. It has author-
ity to assess only one kind of real estate tax which must be 
equal and uniform and must be according to the fair market 
value. As we have shown above the tax in question is in no 
way connected with fair market value and cannot be fairly 
said to be a real estate tax. In fact, the very authority for the 
assessment of the sewer tax is, we repeat, section 170 of the 
Constitution which authorizes the assessment "upon abutting 
property owners • • * for the use of sew·ers. '' 
It is respectfully submitted that under the rule of the South-
ern Railway case, under the argument upon reason and prin-
ciple, and by the analogy with many statutes imposing license 
taxes, the City sewer tax is a license tax and the correction 
thereof may be had only upon an application filed within the 
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one year rule prescribed by section 414 of the Tax Code of 
Virginia. We recognize the sound doctrine that taxing stat-
utes must be strictly construed against the taxing authority, 
but that doctrine does not relate to the construction of stat-
utes affording relief to a taxpayer from an erroneous assess-
ment. Here we are not trying to find a statute upon which we 
can put our finger, saying this statute levies the tax. The sit-
uation is turned around. The taxpayer has no relief at com-
mon law and is entirely dependent upon his ability to find a 
statute which affords relief. The taxpayer is dependent upon 
such a statute as creates the right and prescribes the remedy 
for relief and *he ha.s no right and no remedy unless 
29* and only so far as a statute grants the right and pre-
scribes the remedy. This is settled in Virginia by Lees-
b'U,rg v. Loi1,doi1111, National Bank, 141 Va. 244. Hence, it is re-
spectfully submitted that the doubt need not be resolved in 
favor of the taxpayer, but should be resolved in favor of the 
City. 
III. The Lower Coitrt's Opinion.. 
Judge ·wilson could '' find no escape from tlie view that the 
sewer tax was a privilege tax'', bu't he said that the word "li-
cense'' must have been used in its ordinary sense and that it 
ref erred to such a license as the ordinary man had in mind, 
such as the lawyer's license, or a pawnbroker's license, and 
had nothing to do with the privilege of using a sewer. He 
then construed the word "assessment" as it was used in the 
1936 Enabling .Act and in section 414 of the Tax Code of Vir-
ginia, holding that in the latter law the word '' assessment" 
had two meanings : one being the amount of the tax one has 
to pay, in which use there is no discretion, and the other being 
the value of the property, in which use there was involved a 
discretion in the officer. On the other hand, he held that the 
I~nabling Act's use of the word "assessment'' was such that 
it referred to the value of the property, involving discretion, 
and had nothing to do with the sewer tax, as there was no 
discretion involved in the assessment of the sewer tax .. 
30* His third holding, in which *he had '' no trouble what-
soever", was that the tax was not a license tax but a tax 
on land, and that the Enabling Act did not apply, but that 
section 414 of the Tax Code did apply. Hence, he said the two 
year limit of section 414 as to taxes on real estate applied and 
not the one year limit of the Enabling Act as to assessment of' 
real estate. 
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Our first criticism of the lower court's reasoning and 
opinion is that the rule as to ordinary meanings does not have 
any application where the very nature of the subject, such as 
the reference to a technical legal matter of licenses, requires 
the technical meaning. vVe respectfully submit that the use 
of the words "license tax'' in section 414 of the Tax Code 
requires that a technical meaning be given to them. They are 
technical, legal words, used in a statute of general meaning 
and effect, and the words themselves should be given the tech-
nical, legal meaning. ,v e believe that we have shown by our 
arguments upon reason and principle and upon authority that 
tl1e words '' license tax'' embrace such a tax as is imposed 
upon the privilege of using a sewer. 
The second criticism is that such a rule of construction 
as may be applied to section 414 of the Tax Code applies 
equally as well to the Enabling Act. If the Court is sound in 
its view that the sewer tax is a tax on real estate, then in the 
mind of the ordinary man who reads the language, the '' as-
sessment of real estate" or the "assessment of a real estate 
tax", whether under section 414 of the Tax Code or under 
the Enabling Act, should *embrace the act of imposing 
31 • the sewer tax. The rule of ordinary meaning applies 
equally as well to the word ''assessment'' as it does 
to the word ''license". The Court has held that a sewer tax 
is a real estate tax and the assessment of a sewer tax must 
therefore be the assessment of a real estate tax. Certainly 
an ordinary man ,vho considers the meaning of '' the assess-
ment of a real estate tax'' would include in those words such 
a tax as the City sewer tax, which is made a lien upon the 
real estate, is embraced in the real estate tax bill, and is pay-
able in exactlv the same manner as the real estate tax itself. 
In fact, counsel for the taxpayer has strenuously argued in 
the lower court that there was no difference at all between 
the sewer tax and the ordinary ad valorem real estate prop-
erty tax. If there is no di:ff erence hetween the two, then the 
Enabling Act which sets up a method for the correction of 
the assessment of real estate, should control the correction 
of the sewer tax as well as the correction of the ad valorem 
real estate tax. "\Ve, therefore. respectfullv submit that, as-
suming for argument's sake the correctness of the lower 
court's view that the sewe1· tax is a tax on real estate and not 
a license tax, the Enabling Act limit of one year s110uld con-
trol the correction of the sewer tax. · 
The third criticism that we make is that a privilege tax 
cannot at the same time be a tax upon real estate. For many 
years Virginia and most of its municipalities including the 
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City of Richmond have had tax systems which recognized the 
distinction between license taxes and privilege taxes on the 
one hand and real estate taxes on the other hand. This 
32* recognized •and long established distinction should for-
bid this Court from saying that there is in fact no such 
distinction between a privilege tax and a real estate tax. Yet 
Judge ,vnson plainly held that there was no distinction be-
tween a privilege tax and a real estate tax, as appears from 
his statement that he saw no escape from the view that the 
tax was a privilege tax and yet he had no trouble whatsoever 
in concluding that the tax was a tax on land. vV e respect-
fully submit that there is still the long established well recog-
nized difference in effect, in the manner of assessment, and 
in the very nature of the taxes themRelves, between a privi-
lege tax and a real estate tax and that the sewer tax is a 
privilege tax. Hence, we submit the lower court was ·wTong 
and should have held the tax to be a privilege, or license 
tax subject to the one year rule of section 414 of the Tax Code 
of Virginia. 
CON:CLUSION. 
By its very nature, under the general principles of law 
and under the doctrine of the Southern Railway case, the 
tax in question is a license tax and relief therefrom is gov-
erned by section 414 of the Tax Code of Virginia with re-
spect to license taxes. If it be not a license tax but a real 
estate tax, then by virtue of the 1936 Enabling Act the fun-
itation of time is still one year. In either case the ap-
33* plication for :[<the refund of the 1938 tax items ·was made 
too late. 
WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that a writ of error 
and s1t.persecleas be granted herein in order that the matter 
may be fully argued before and considered by this Honorable 
Court, and that the judgment complained of may be reversed 
and counsel for the petitioner herein desires to state orally 
to the Court their reasons for reviewing- the decision com-
plained of and further prays that reasonable opportunity may 
be allowed them therefor. · 
In the event that a wTit of error be awarded herein, the 
City of Richmond adopts this petition and the argument in 
support thereof as t11e brfof for the City of Richmond. 
Counsel for the City of Richmond aver that a copy of this 
petition and the brief in support was upon the 3rd day of 
1\farch, 1941, delivered to tlrn opposing counsel in the trial 
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court, and the original hereof is to be filed with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals, at Richmond, Virginia. 
Respectfully, 
HORA.CE H. EDWARDS, 
City Attorney. 
HENRY R. :MILLER, JR., 
Assistant City Attorney. 
I, Henry R. Miller, Jr., whose address is 402 City Hall, 
Richmond, Virginia, and who is an attorney duly qualified to 
practice in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do 
hereby certify that in my opinion the decree and judg:. 
34* ment complained *of in the foregoing petition ought to 
be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia for the reasons set forth in the foregoing petition and 
brief in support thereof. 
HENRY R. MILLER., JR., Attorney. 
Richmond, Virginia, 
March 3rd, 1941. 
Received March 3, 1941. 
Received March 20, 1941. 
l\L B. WATTS, Clerk. 
c.v. s. 
April 16, 1941. ·writ of error and su,persedeas awarded by 
the court. No bond. 
RECORD 
Commonwealth of Vindnia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit; 
M.B.W. 
PleaR at the Courthouse in the City Hall, before the 
Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, on the 15th dav 
of January, in tlrn year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
forty-one. 
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Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit; on the 4th day 
of June, ·1940, H. T. Eubank, Petitioner, filed a Petition for 
the correction of alleged erroneous assessment of City sewer 
taxes for the years 1938, 1939 and 1940, against the City of 
Richmond, Defendant, which said petition is in the words 
and figures following·, to-wit: 
page 2 ~ Virginia: 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
H. T. Eubank 
'l). 
City of Richmond 
PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ERRONEOUS AS-
SESSMENT OF SE,WER TAXES. 
To tbe Honorable John L. Ingram, Judge of the Hustings 
Court of the City of Richmond: 
Your Petitioner, H. T. Eubank, respectfully presents unto 
the court the following· state of facts: 
(1) That your Petitioner is the owner of many parcels 
of real estate located in the City of Richmond, Va., which 
said parcels are unimproved and not connected with any 
sewer of the City of Richmond. 
(2) That for the years 1938, 19·39 and 1940 sewer taxes 
have been assessed against said properties in the amount 
set opposite the description of said properties as follows: 
L-27, B-A, 50x150, N. Bellevue Newport & Brook 
Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 5.00 
L-2. B-K, 50x140, S. Bellevue Newport & Brook 
Road ..................................... . 
4013/21 L-PT31/40 276.55x100, E. Rappahannock, 
Nottoway & Bellevue. 136.55 vacant ......... . 
L-4, B-K, 50x140, ,S. Bellevue Lamont & Newport .. 
L-3, B-K, 50xl40, S. Bellevue Lamont & Newport .. 
L-6. B-K, 50x140, S. Bellevue Lamont & Newport .. 
L-30/31 B-A, 100x1t50, N. Bellevue Newport & Brook 
R,cl. • • • ...•••••.••••••..••.•..••.......•••.• 
. L-26, B-D, 50x125.75 N. Ra.ppaha.nnock Nottoway 
& Bellevue ...................... . 
page 3 } 1211/19 L-1/2/3/4 B-J, 175x140 S. E. Belle-
vue & Lamont 79 feet vacant ....... . 
5.00 
13.60 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00' 
10.00 
5.00 
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L-37, B-A, 75.38xL50 N. Bellevue Newport & Brook 
Rd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.52 
L-20, B-D, 50x125. 75 W. Rappahannock Nottoway & 
Bellevue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.00 
L-18, B-D, 50x125.75 W. Rappahannock Nottoway 
& Bellevue· . . . ............................. · 5.00 
L-21, B-A, 78.07x140, NW Brook Road & Bellevue.. 7.80 
L-19, B-D, 50x125.75 W. Rappahannock Nottoway 
& Bellevue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.00 
E. Cowardin Ave. Mc:Donough & Semmes, 36x73.33. 3.60 
L-23, B-D, 50x125. 75 W. Rappahannock Bellevue & 
Nottoway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.00 
L-21/22, B-D, lOOx:125.75 W. Rappahannock Bellevue 
& Nottoway . ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.00 
$109.32 
(3) That the foregoing taxes represent the taxes for each 
year so that the amount whieh your Petitioner has been 
assessed, and which he has paid for the years 1938 and 1939 
will be a. total of $218.64. 
( 4) That each of the foregoing lots or parcels of lantl 
nre vacant and unimproved, and your Petitioner makes no 
use whatever of the City sewerage system by reason of his 
ownership of said parcels of rea] estate. 
( 5) Your Petitioner is advised, and therefore charges, 
that the assessment of sewer taxes against the aforesaid 
parcels of land by the City of Richmond is without authority 
in law, is contrary to the Constitution and laws of the State 
of Virginia, and to the charter and ordinances of the City 
of Richmond, and constitute the taking of your petitioner's 
property without due process of la.w and in violation of 
his rights under the Constitution of the State of Virginia 
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United .States. 
WHEREFORE, your Petitioner prays that the assess-
ment of the aforesaid sewer taxes on the parcels of land for 
the years 1938, 1939 and 1940 may be corrected an? 
pag-e 4 ~ expunged from the tax records and that your Peti-
tioner-be refunded for the taxes which he has paid 
for the vears 1938 and 1939, and that your Petitioner may 
ha.ve such other further and general relief as the nature 
of the case may require. 
H. T. EUBANK, 
By GUY B. HAZELGROVE 
Counsel. 
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page 5 } And that on the same day, to-wit, on the 4th day 
of June; 1940, and in the said Hustings Court, the 
following order was entered, to-wit; 
H. T. Eubank; 
v. 
City of Riclnnond. 
PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF .AiSSESSMENT OF 
TAXES. 
The said H. T. Eubank this day presented a petition pray-
ing· for the correction of alleged erroneous assessment of City 
taxes, which petition is received and ordered to be docketed 
and set for hearing. 
page 6 ~ And at another day, to-wit; on the 19th day of 
November, 1940, and before the same Hustings 
Court, the following order was entered, to-wit; 
.page 7 ~ Virginia : 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
H. T. Eubank 
v. 
City of Richmond 
FINAL DECREE. 
. ' 
This day came the petitioner, H. T. Eubank, and by leave 
of court filed his Petition herein, praying for the cancella-
tion of certain sewer taxes for tl1e vear HJ-40 and for a re-
fund of sewer taxes for tl1e years 1938 and 1939, of the filing of 
which said Petition the Commissioner of R,evenne and the 
City Attorney of the City of Richmond received due and 
timely notice, and thereupon said Petition was ordered 
docketed a.nd set for hearing. 
Wbereupon the matter was heard in open court upon the 
testimony of witnesses for the Petitioner and for the De-
fendant, and wa.s defended by the City Attorney of the City 
of Richmond, and tl1e court doth certify that John C. Goode, 
·Commissioner of Revenue of. the City of Richmond, appeared 
and testified and that Robert L. Saville, Chairman of the 
Board of Real Estate Assessors of the City of Richmond: 
likewise a pp ea.red and testified. 
CitJ of Eichmo:nd v! H. T. Euba..:nk 
The court doth further certify that the 1940 taxes have 
not been paid; that the 1939 and 1938 taxes have been paid; 
and that said properties did not actually use the city sewer 
at any time during the ye&rs 1938, 1939 and 1940 . 
... ~nd the court being of the opinion, for the reason~ set 
forth in a written memorandum opinion attached 
ipage 8 ~ hereto and hereby made a part of this Order, that 
the Petitioner is entitled to the relief prayecl for 
in his said Petition, doth Order that the sewer taxes as-
8essed against the Petitioner for the years 1938 and 1939 on 
the properties and for the amounts hereinafter set forth be 
refunded and that the said sewer taxes on said properties 
for the year 1940 ,be cancelled as erroneous assessments, the 
said properties and the amounts of said taxes for each year 
being as follows : 
L-27, B-A, 50x150, N. Bellevue Newport & Brook 
E,oad ..................•............. · · .... 
L-2, B-K, 50x140, S. Bellevue Newport & Brook 
Road ..................................... . 
4013/21 L-PT31/40 276.55x100, E. Rappahannock, 
Nottoway & Bellevue 136.55 vacant ........... . 
L-4, B-K, 50x140, S. Bellevue Lamont & Newport .. 
L-3, B-K, 50x140, S. Bellevue· Lamont & Newport .. 
L-6, B-K, 50x140, S. Bellevue Lamont & Newport .. 
L-30/31 B-A, 100x150, N. Belle-vue Newport & Brook 
Rd ........................................ . 
L-26, B-D, 50x125.75 N. Rappahannock Nottoway & 
Bellevt1e . . . .............................. . 
1211/19 L,-1/2/3/4 B-J, 175xl40 iS. E. Bellevue & 
Lamont 79 feet vacant . . .................. . 
L-37, B-A, 75.38x150 N~ Bellevue Newport & Brook 
R.d ........................................ . 
L-20, B-D, 50x125.75 W. Rappahannock Nottoway & 
Bellevt1e . . ............ ~ ................... . 
L-18, B-D, 50x125.75 vV. Rappahannock Nottoway & 
Bellevue .................................. . 
L-21, B-A, 78.07:xl 40, N·w Brook Road & Bellevue .. 
L-19, B-D, 50x125.75 \V. Rappahannock Nottoway & 
Bellevue .................................. . 
E. Cowa rel in Ave. 1\foDonoug·h & Semmes, 36,x73.33 .. 
L-23, B-D, 50x125.75 ·w. Rappahannock Bellevue & 
Nottowav ................................. . 
L-21/22. B-D: 100x125. 75 "\V. Rappahannock Bellevue 
& N ottowa.y . . . ............................ . 
$ 5.00 
5.00 
l.3.60 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
10.00 
5.00 
6.80 
7.52 
5.00 
5.00 
7.80 
5.00 
3.60 
5.00 
10.00 
Total Sewer Taxes. . . . . . . . . . . . $109.32 
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ANDi IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Comptroller 
of the City of Richmond do, upon presentation to him of a 
certified copy of this Order, issue his warrant upon the City 
of Richmond in favor of H. T. Eubank for the sum of Two 
Hundred Eighteen Dollars and Sixty-four Cents ($218.64), 
the same being the amount of said refund. 
To which judgment and Order of the court in ordering 
a re.fund of the 19'38 sewer taxes, tl1e defendant, by counsel, 
duly excepted and prayed tha.t its exception be noted of 
record, which is accordingly done. 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the transcript 
containing· the testimony introduced by each of the parties 
hereto in this cause and bearing the initials "R. T·. W." be, 
and the same is hereby, ma.de a part of the record in this 
cause. 
And the defendant by ·counsel, indicating· its intent to ap-
ply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Vir-
ginia from the judgment and Order of this court, it is 
ORDERED that the execution of this Order be, and the 
same is hereby, suspended for a period of ninety days from 
this date. 
page 9 ~ Virginia : 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
H. T. Eubank 
v. 
City of Richmond. 
Transcript of opinion of the Court banded down on the 
16th day of November, 1940, in the above-entitled cause bv 
Hon. Richard T. Wilson, acting Judge of said Court. ~ 
Appearances: Guy B. Hazelgrove, Esq., Of c.ounsel for 
the petitioner. 
Henry R. Miller, Jr., Esq., Assistant City Attorney. 
pag·e 10 ~ The Court: This is a case in which the peti-
tioner seeks to have refunded to him taxes which 
l1e paid for the years 1938, 1939 and 1940 called sewer taxes. 
The City contests the petitioner's right to recover these 
taxes on two grounds. The first ground is that these taxes 
a.re license taxes. The second ground is that under what 
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has been referred to as the Enabling Act, that is, an act of 
the General Assembly approved March 25, 1.936, and found 
in the Acts of the Assembly of 1936, page 440, the petitioner 
has 110 right to have a refund of the tax paid for 1938. The 
City admits that it should refund the taxes for 1940 and 1939, 
and it does this on the theorv that the taxes are license 
taxes. "' 
The first question, therefore, is whether or not these taxes 
are license taxes or taxes on real estate. 
/'This case grows out of the case of Southern Railway Co. 
v. City of Richmond, 8 S. E. 2d, 271, in which case the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virg·inia declared that the or-
dinance of the City of Richmond was unconstitutional, that 
is, the ordinance imposing these sewer taxes. The Court 
feels that the case wa.s properly decided, but whether or not 
the Court should feel that way, this case is binding upon the 
Court at this time; and furthermore the language employed 
in that decision is also binding on the Court. I see no way 
of escaping the view that the Supreme Court of 
page 11 ~ Appeals in the above-mentioned decision has come 
to the conclusion that these sewer taxes are privi-
lege taxes. The language used in more than one place is 
that they are taxes for the "privilege of using" the sewers. 
And therefore I shall proceed on the theory that these taxes 
H re privilege taxes. 
However, the word "privilege" and the word "license" 
are not synonymous terms. 
In Webster's New International Dictionary ''privilege'' 
is defined as a '' rig·ht or immunity granted as a peculiar bene-
fit, advantage or faYor." ''License" is defined as "au-
thority or liberty given to do or forbear any act; permis-
sion to do something {specified); especially a formal per-
mission from the proper authorities to perform certain acts, 
or to carry on a certain business which without such per-
mission would be illegal; also, the document embodying such 
permission, as a license to preach, to practice medieine, to 
sell gunpowder or intoxicating· liquors.'' 
I do not feel that a license and a privilege are one and 
the same thing. 
In the Southern Railway Company case a.boYe referred to, 
Mr. Justice Hudgins referred to the decision of Quesinberry 
v. Hull, 159 Va. 270, 165 S. E. 382, 383, and he uses 
page 12 ~ the following· language : 
"Judge Holt, speaking for the court in Quesinberry v. Hull_. 
159 Va. 270, 165 .S. E. 382, 383, and quoting· from Black on 
30 S1.1prem~ Court. of .Appeals of Virginia 
Interpretation of Laws, page 25, said: 'It is a general rule 
that the words 9f a Constitution are to be understood in the 
sense in which they are pop1.1,larly ernployed, unless the con-
text or the. very nature of the subject indicates otherwise.' '' 
\Vliat is· s4id there about the interpretation to be placed 
upon a constitutional enactment is equally applicable to a 
sta.tute, and in a. statute words i:;bould be construed in their 
ordinary and accepted mea1iing. Consequently, in Section 
414 of the Tax Code, I feel that the word "license" should 
be used in its ordinary and accepted meaning, and I cannot 
co:ine t9 the conclusion that the ordinary and accepted mean-
ing of '' licenf;e'' as used in Section 414 of the Tax Code 
has to clo with the privilege of using a sewer. I think the 
word ''license'' there used means an ordinary license which 
the ordiuary man considers a license: namely, a license which 
a man has to pay to operate a pawnbroker's establishment, 
or a license which a lawyer has to take out to practice law. 
I am quite positive that it has nothing to do in that section 
of the Code with a privilege of doing a certain thing like 
using a sewer. Consequently I am of the opinion that the 
taxes here are not license taxes. 
I might add that in the opinion in the .Southern Railway 
Company case these taxes are ref erred to as ''assessments'' 
or ''special assessments'' and nowher_e in the opinion are 
t~referred to as ''licenses.'' 
page 13 ~ (. ·~·1!e second point. is 'Yhether or not the Enabling 
Act bars recovery m view of the fact that the En-
a.bling Act says tha.t relief can be had if a petition is filed 
within one year from December 31st of the year in which 
the assessment. is made. 
If a proper study is made of Section 414 of the Tax Code 
it will be observed that the word '' assessment" used in 
that section has two separate and distinct meanings. The 
Court is of tl1e opinion that it. would be wise to have this 
section cla rifled. In certain plac.es the word ''assessment'' 
refers to t.be tax the individual has to pay. In other parts 
of it it refers to the value placed upon the property; and 
the section must be construed in view of those two different 
meanings of the word ''assessment." For instance, the first 
sentenc.e of this section is as follows: 
'' Any person assessed with county or city levies or other 
local taxes on real estate ag:g:rieved by any such assessment 
rnay, unless otherwise provided by law, within two years 
from the 31st day of December of the year in which such as· 
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sessment is made, and any person assessed with local levies 
on personal property or a local license tax aggrieved thereby 
ma.y within one year from the 31st day of December of the 
year in which such assessment is made, apply for relief to 
the Circuit Court of the County or any city court 
page 15 ~ of record of' the city wherein such assessment was 
made:'' 
·where the word ''assessment'' is used in this sentence it 
can apply only to one thing, that is, the amount of the ta.x 
(the money) the individual is supposed to pay. The next 
sentence in that same paragraph is as follows: 
. '' In such proceeding the burden of proof shall be upo1i 
the taxpayer to show the property in question is assessed 
at more than the fair market value or that such assessment 
is not uniform in its application, but it shall not be neces-
sary for the taxpayer to show that intentional~ systematic 
and willful discrimination has been made.'' 
. In that serttertce the word ''assessment'' can only apply faj 
the value of the property, and hns nothing to do with the 
amount of the tax assessed upo~ the value 0£ the property: 
Also in another place this section says this: 
"If the Chu.rt be satisfied from the evidence that the as-
sessment is erroneous nnd that the erroneous assessment 
was not,.caused PY the willful failure OJ~ refusal or the appli-
~ant to furnish a list of .his property to the tax ~ssessing· au-
thority as the law requires, or that the applicant is errone-
ously -~barged w~th a lqcal license tax and tha.t t~1e erroneous 
assessment was not. caused bv the willful failure or refusal 
. of the applicant to furnish the tax assessing au-
pag·e 16 ~ thority. with the necessa1:y informati01~ as re-
. quir~d by law, in either case the Court may order 
that the assessment be corrected.'' 
. There again it, the word ''assessment,'' refers to the money 
the taxpayer has to pay and not to the value of the thing, 
because local license taxes are not placed on the value of 
something tangible. There are in the City of Ric.bmond, I 
presume, like in all other cities, certain specified license taxes 
of specified amounts to carry on certain specified businesses, 
irrespective of whether the business is a large business or a 
small one. So I repeat tha.t the word ''assessment" there 
refers to money paid or whic.h should be paid. 
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The next sentence, however, reads this way: 
'' If in the opinion of the Court the assessment exceeds the 
proper amount, the Court may reduce the assessment to what 
in its opinion, •based on the evidence, is the fair market value 
of the property involved, and shall order the applicant to 
be exon~~ratcrl from the payment of so much as is erroneously 
charged if not already paid, and, if paid, that it be· refunded 
to him. If i~ the opinion of the Court the assessment be less 
than the proper amount, the Court shall order the assess-
ment increased to what in its opinion is the fair market value 
of the property involved and shall order that the applicant 
pay the proper tax.'' 
There it, the word "assessment", can· refer only to the 
value of the property. I could. go through the bal-
page 17 ~ ance of that section and point out other instances 
as to the meaning of the word "assessment", but 
I do not feel that it is necessary. It would show that the 
word ''assessment'' sometimes refers to the actual tax, the 
amount the person should pay, and in other instances it re-
fers to the value of the property on which the levy is made. 
Now, in what I have referred to as the Enabling Act, that 
is, the act in the Ac.ts of the Assembly for 1936, page 440, 
the word "asse~sment" is used, and we find this: That the 
City of Richmond "may elect one or more persons to assess 
such real estate for taxation * * *.'' ~rhen we find this: '' All 
such real estate shall be assessed at its fair market value. 
and taxes for enc.h of such vears shall be extended bv the 
assessor or assessors on the b~sis of the last assessment made 
prior to such year, subject to such change as may be la,v-
fully made.'' 
Paragraph 3 is as follows : 
'' Any person or any such city aggrieved by any such as-
sessment may apply for relief to the Hustings or Corpora-
tion Court of such City within one year from the 31st day 
of December in the year in which such assessment is made, 
and the procedure in such cases shall be in tl1e manner pre-
~cribecl by Section 414 of the Tax Code of Virginia.." 
The City of Richmond passed an ordinance 
page 1·8 }- which was approved on August 5th, 1937, a.nd cer:. 
ta.in observations relative to the ordinance mav 
·be beneficial. · 
Th(.l title to tl1e ordinance in part is as follows: 
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"To provide for the assessment of real estate in the City 
of Richmond in the year 1938 and each year thereafter; to 
provide for the equalization of such assessment • • •.'' 
In this ordinance it is stated that those persons who will 
be named as assessors '' shall, as soon as practicable after 
the first da.y of September, 1937, proceed to organize and 
prepare to assess real estate in the City of Riehmond in the 
year 1938." Again, it says that these assessors "shall, upon 
examination, ascertain and assess the fair market value 
thereof.'' Again, it says: ''In making the assessment herein 
provided for, the last reassessment made shall be the basis 
of such assessment * * *." Then again it states that these 
assessors '' shall certify on oath that all real estate assessed 
by them bas been assessed at fair market value.'' 
The ordinance further states that there shall be three as-
sessors, and it states that: "at least one of whom shall have 
engaged in the real estate bm,iness in the City of Richmond 
and at least one of whom shall have eng·a.ged in the business 
of constructing and erecting buildings in the City of Rich-
mond.'' 
I do not think that it is open to argument that 
page 19 } the ordinance of the City of Richmond and the 
Enabling; Act show ·conclusively that the assess-
ment referred to in the Enabling· .Act and in the ordinance 
is an assessment of the value ofcthe property and has noth-
in~· to do with the tax paid on the property, which tax, of 
course. is obtained by multiplying the assessed value of the 
property by the rate of taxation. 
In this case of the sewer taxes there is no question of 
discretion involved. The tax is laid hv the Council at so 
much per lineal foot. The assessment referred to in the En-
~ bling- Act and in tl1e ordinance has to do with the value or 
property. 
In Breckenbrid,qe v. Cou,nty School Boa.rd, 146 Va. 1, 
.J ud~·e Burks, speaking for the Court, on page 5 said: 
''There is a marked, difference between making a levy and 
the assessment of property for the purpose of taxation. A 
levy is merely fixing the subject and the amount at which 
l)roperty is to be taxed. An assessment consists in listing 
th~ property and putting· a value thereon to which the rate 
fixed hy the levy is to .be applied. It is quasi judiciial. The 
Rtatute does not contravent the provision of Section 63 of 
the Oo11stitution. Countv of S'Ussex v. larmtt, 129 Va. 672, 
106 S. E. 384." 
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Also, in McGinnis v. Nelson County, 146 Va . .J.170, Judgc:i 
Campbell, speaking for the Court, at page 173 said: 
'' 'Levy and assessment have very different 
page 20 ~ .meanings. The levy of ta..xes is a legislative func-
tion, and declsres the subject and rate of taxa-
tion.' Hilliard on Taxation, page 290. 'Assessment is quasi 
judicial, and consists in making a list of the taxpayer's prop..: 
erty and fixing its valuation; or a.ppraisement.' Id. 29.'' 
The assessment referred to in the Enabling Act and in 
the ordinance is the assessment of value, wherein the as-
sessors exercise their discretion; and is quasi judicial: Con..: 
seque~tly I am of the opinion that the statute of limitations 
of one year as provided in the Enabling ..A.ct has nothing to 
tlo with this .case; 
I have had no trouble· whtttsoever in arriving at the con...: 
clusion, first, that this tax is not a license tax but a tax on 
land: It is interesting tb note that nothing in the record 
here shows that the City of Richmond ever con_sidered this 
a. license tax until the case of the Southern Railwav Com..: 
pany was decided. The eV1.d~nce, in so far as it bea1:s .. on this 
subject, sh_ows conclusiv~ly_ that the. city considered this 
se'Yer. tax just like a.ny o~her_ real ~state . .tax. It is made a 
lien on real estate ; it is a burden on real estate; and while 
i~ is a tax, i~ my opinion, for. a priyilege, nevertheless. it iEi 
a t_ax on real estate, notwithstanding the facr· it is for a 
privilege. . _ . . _ . .. . . . 
. ~ either have I hac;l any trouble in a.rriving at. th~ conclu..: 
fiion that the. Enabling· Act did not apply to. this case. . 
. . . . ~s requires {hat I say that I have had 
pag·e 21 ~ some trouble in . arriving· at a conclusion as to 
. _ whether or not Section 414. of the Tax Code wa.i 
broad enoug·h. to cover this case, and that is the qnly: t_rou~le 
I h~ve had ... But when I analyze _that s~ction, as I _hav~ at~ 
tempted to analyze it briefly, I have come to the conclusion 
tlrn.t the General Assembly intendecJ that_ anyone asse·ssed 
~vitl; a tax hag. a right to apply. for a refund if _the tax_ was 
an erroneous. one. The first senten~e, whic11 is quoted above, 
states yery ppsitively. that. those J.!ersons assessed as there 
stated m~y apply to the Court for _a refund; and in .that ~~n-
tenee I am quite positive that the word "assessment" means 
the amount off the .t~x it.self. _,Therefore J_am of the 9phJio1~ 
that Section 414 is broad enough to cover this particular 
t 11 '\ 
case: 
Consequently tl1e prayer of the petitioner that the City 
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cancel or refund the taxes for. all three years will be granted. 
I regret that time does not permit me to write a formal 
opinion, and if these remarks have been unduly long, it is 
because I felt that I should go into some detail to show how 
I arrived at the conclusion at which I have arrived. When 
the order is entered in this case these remarks will be made 
a part of the record. 
1Ir. Miller: I would like to note an exception, if Your 
Honor please. 
The Court: Yes, I understand. Mr. Hazelgrove, will you 
please prepare what you think is a proper order and submit 
it to Mr. Miller? 
pag·e 22 ~ Mr. Hazelgrove: I will do it Monday. 
The Court: I do not think you gentlemen will 
have any trouble in agreeing· on the phraseology. If you do, 
you can take it up with me when I come over here, and, Mr. 
Hazelgrove, put in the order anything Mr. Miller wants to 
put in it about excepting to the ruling of the Court and so 
forth. 
page 23 ~ Virginia: 
In the Hustings Court of Richmond. 
H. T. Eubank 
v. 
City of Richmond 
.T udge R. T. ·wnson presiding. 
Appearances: Guy B. Hazelgrove, Esq., Counsel for Peti-
tioner. 
Henry R. Miller, l r., Esq., Counsel for Defendant. 
September 18, 1940. 
page 24 ~ l\fr. Hazelgrove: Before beginning the hearing 
o:f this matter we ask leave to amend the petition 
that has been filed on behalf of H. T. Eubank by changing 
on page one the figure opposite 4013-21-L-PT-31-40 276.55 by 
100 feet East Rappal1annock, etc., from $1'3.65 to $13.60, that 
having been the amount agreed upon; by changing· on page 
two opposite the first item on that na.g-e $7.90 to read $6.80. 
·with Your Honor's permission I will make the change upon 
the original petition. 
The Court: Mr. Miller, you have no objection to that? 
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Mr. Miller: No, sir. 
The Court: All right. 
Mr. Miller: Paragraph three I think the total is to be 
changed according to that. 
Mr. Hazelgrove : That will change the total from $110.47 
to $109.32, which we ask leave to change upon the original. 
I also ask leave in paragraph three of the petition to change 
the figure appearing at the end of that paragraph from 
$531.41 to $218.64. 
I should like to read into the record the following stipula-
tion between counsel : 
It is stipulated and agreed that the following facts shall 
be considered by the Court in the hearing of this cause as 
having been proven, namely: 
page 25 t 1. All pertinent provisions of the charter of the 
City of Richmond. 
2. All pertinent ordinances of the City of Richmond. 
3. That the tax in question in this cause and ref erred to 
as the sewer tax is, as a matter of administrative practice, 
placed upon the real estate tax bills of the City of Richmond 
under the separate heading entitled "Sewer Tax". 
4. That as a matter of administrative practice the sewer 
tax is divided in half in the same manner as the real estate 
ad valorem tax and one-half thereof paid without penalty on 
or before June 30th and the remaining one-half paid on or 
before December 31st. 
5. That in the event of default in the payment of the sewer 
tax the same penalty is added thereto as is added to the real 
estate tax. 
.JOHN E. GOODE, 
a witness called in behalf of the petitioner, being first duly 
sworn, testifled as follows : 
DIR,ECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. Mr. Goode, you are the Commissioner of 
page 26 ~ the Revenue of the City of Riehmonil? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you been the Commissioner of the Reve·-
nuei 
A. Since J a.nua ry 1, 1934. 
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Q. Mr. Goode, have you examined the books in your office 
to see if the sewer taxes ref erred to in the petition of H. T. 
Eubank filed in this cause are assessed against him? 
A. I have not. 
Q. Have. you examined the land books of the City of Rich-
mond to see if these assessments have been made or have 
you examined copies of the tax bills? 
A. I have not. 
Q. Have you made any examination of the records in that 
respect! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I hand you now what purports to be receipted tax bills 
-covering the sewer taxes referred to in the petition and ask 
you if they are the official receipts furnished by the City 
of Richmond upon the payment of sewer taxes and real es-
tate taxes? 
Mr. Miller: If Your Honor please, I object to this witness 
.answering· that question bec.ause it is not shown Mr. Goode 
has any official ,connection whatever with respect 
page 27 ~ to the assessment complained of or the receipts 
shown. 
The Court: Objection overruled. He can answer that 
question. 
l\Ir. ]\filler: We note the exception . 
. Mr. Hazelgrove : I should like to say that in offering this 
evidence we do not make any effort to prejudice the position 
of ·the City Attorney that the entire duty with respect to 
real estate taxes and, as he claims, sewer taxes is vested 
now in the Board of Assessors. We are proceeding under 
Rection 414 of the Tax Code which requires that the Com-
missioner of the Revenue be examined, for what purpose I 
do not know, but the final order must show he was examined 
nnd it is only for that purpose we are examining him. 
Q. Mr. Goocle, are those receipts issued by the City of 
Richmond? 
A. As far as I know, they seem to be correct receipts. 
Mr. HazelgTove: "re introduce in evidence, if Your Honor 
please, the official receipts of the City of Richmond showing 
the payment of the last half of real estate and 
page 28 ~ sewer taxes for the year ·L938, a.s alleged in the 
._ petition, and which receipts, showing the payment 
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of the second half, naturally show the payment of the first 
half. 
The Court-: Do they show anything about 193911 
Mr. Hazelg;rove: No, sir, they do not show anything with 
respect to 19·39. 
Note : Filed and marked Exhibit No. 1. 
Q. Now, Mr. Goode, I hand you a bunch of receipts cover-
ing the property set out in the petition of r.fr. Eubank in 
this cause and ask you if that is the official receipt furnished 
by the City of Richmond? 
Mr. Miller: May I ask wl1at is the purpose of having this 
witness testify to something that he lmows nothing about 
officially? Is it simply to get tl1e receipts in the record t If 
so, he can offer them a.s receipts and the City concedes them. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: I am offering Mr. Goode, because the 
statute says I must do so. I knew Mr. Miller would admit 
these are the official receipts of tbe City of Richmond, but I 
had to ask him something besides his name. 
The Court : Answer the question. 
page 29 ~ A. They are, as far as I know. 
Note : Filed and marked Exhibit No. 2. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller : 
Q. Wliat is the last real estate assessment made bv the 
Commissioner of the Revenue of the City of Richmond i 
A. 1937. 
Q. What is the last sewer tax assessment made · by the 
Commissioner of the Revenue or any deputy in I1is office in 
tI1e City of Richmond? 
A. 1937. 
Q. Where are the 19'38 land books? 
A. I presume they are in the office of the Board of As-
sessors. 
Q. fa there any copy in your office Y 
A. No, sir. 
City of Richmond v. H. T. Eubank 
John E. Goode. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove : 
Q. You have not assessed any sewer taxes since 1937 Y 
A. No, sir. 
39 
Q. vVho assesses all of the license taxes of the City of 
Richmond? 
A. The Commissioner of the Revenue's office. 
Q. That is, your office 1 
A. Yes. 
r .. , ... 0. 30 ~ Q. And you do not asse~s the sewer tax? 
A. No. 
Q. And have not sinc.e 1937? 
A. That is right. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By l\fr. Miller: 
Q. You mean by license faxes, do you not, as far as the 
City is concerned, the license taxes prescribed by Chapter 
10 of the Richmond City Code of 1:937? 
A. Business licenses. 
RE·-DIRECT EX.A:MINATION. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove : 
Q. What other license ta.xes are there? 
M:r. l\filler: I object to calling for the expression of an 
opinion as to a. matter of law. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. As a matter of fact, l\fr. Goode, you are charged with 
the duty of assessing license taxes, are you not T 
A. That is right.. · 
Q. And you examine the Code of the City of Richmond to 
see what license taxes are contained in that Code so vou can 
fully perform your duty? · 
page 31 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you to the best of your knowledge a.nd 
belief assessed all the license taxes due the City of R.foh-
mond T 
A. ·Yes. 
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Q. For the year 1938 f 
A. Yes. 
Q. And for the year 1939? 
A. That is right, sir. 
RE-OROSS EXA.l\UNATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. You still mean by the phrase '' lieense taxes'' in those 
answers the same license taxes referred to before, namely: 
business licenses prescribed by Chapter 10 of the Richmond 
City Code of 1937? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court: 
Q. I don't know that it has anything to do with this case, 
ibut since you are asking about licenses what lieenses do you 
issue in your office? 
A. All State and City business licenses and we assess in-
tangibles for the State and income for the State, fire insur-
ance premiums and bank stock for the State. 
Q. In other words, any license that a man has to get to 
do anything if required by the State, you issue it 1 
pag-e 32 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. You still mean, do you not, in response to the Judge's 
question that the word "license" relates to the taxes pre-
scribed in Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code and to no 
other license taxes Y 
A. Absolutely. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. What other license taxes are there Y 
Mr. Miller: I object. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
By the Court: 
· Q. Suppose there is a statute in the State of Virginia re-
quiring a man to get a license to, do a certain thing and there 
is nothing in the Code of the City of Richmond requiring 
him to get a license, doesn't your office issue that license? 
A. Tha.t depends upon his business. If his business was: 
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not classified under the City Code, I would still assess that 
under section 166, not otherwise classified. 
Q. Who assesses the real property in the City of Richmond Y 
A. The Board of Assessors. 
Q. Every year? 
A. Yes, sir. That is a permanent Board. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 33 ~ ROBERT L. SA VILLE, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the petitioner, 
being first duly sworn, testified a.s follows : 
DIRECT EXA~UNATION. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. You are Mr. Robert L. SaYilleT 
A. Yes. 
Q. What position do you hold? 
A. I am Chairman of the Board of Assessors. 
Q. Mr. Saville, have you examined the records in your of-
fice with respect to the allegations contained in the petition 
of H. T. Eubank in this matter? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As amended, are the allegations of that petition true¥ 
A. Yes, sir, according to our rec.ords. 
Q. Were the sewer taxes set forth in that petition assessed 
against the properties as set forth in that petition? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are those properties unimproYed? 
.A. All of them. 
Q. And hence, of course, not connected with the city sewer? 
A. I couldn't sa.y about that. 
page 34 } Q. Well, there wouldn't be anything to connect 
with, would there? 
A. Well, yes, there is a sewer in the street in front of 
them. 
Q. But don't you know there are no houses or dwellings 
that could be connected? 
A. Yes, there are no hom;es on the property. 
Q. Mr. Saville, your office makes the assessment ~n real 
estate in the City? 
A. That is correct. 
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Q. And by that assessment you affix the value, do yon not, 
to the real estate and separately to the improvements 1 
A. That is rjgbt. 
Q. The rate ·of taxation is not fixed by your office Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That is fixed by the council of the City of Richmond Y 
A. That is right. 
Q. And the assessment of a sewer tax under the existing 
ordinance is merely a front foot tax t 
A. That is correct. 
Q. So that the assessment of that tax is purely mathemati-
caH 
A.. E.ntirely. 
Q. Involving no discretion in your office 1 
Mr. Miller: I would like for the counsel not to lead his 
own witness to that extent. I think every ques-
page 35 ~ tion asked him is leading. I don't object to some 
of them, but I do object to the last one. 
Mr. HazelgTove: I will strike that out. 
Q. In the assessment of the sewer tax what processes do 
you go through to assess it? 
A. Sewer taxes are charged at 10 cents per front foot 
for the amount of frontage of the street with which the prop-
erty is assessed. 
Q. And from what source do you get the front footage to 
assess that tax T 
A. From the records of the land 1books and our individual 
property cards as to the number of front feet, which in-
formation has been heretofore obtained from record deeds. 
Q. From whose office is that information contained? 
A. It is obtained from the Chancery and other court rec-
ords by our office since 1938. 
Q. Your office gets that information Y 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Cl{OSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. ·Saville, you are Chairman of the Board of Real 
Estate Assessors for the City of Richmond, are you not? 
A. That is right, sir. 
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page 36 }, A.. It was created on November 1, 1937. We ac-
tually took office about the 20th of December. 
Q. How many are there on the Board T 
A. Three. 
Q. Do you act together in making these assessments or do 
you act independently? 
A. w· e act as a board. 
Q. You are familiar with the assessments that are ma.de 
generally and particularly the assessments in this particular 
case! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·what was the first year for which taxes were assessed 
on real estate and for sewers in the City of Richmond by 
the Board of Real Estate Assessors? 
A. For the year 1938. 
Q. 2\..nd you have made them for each year since then? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you not have to consider many questions of fact with 
respect to the several pieces of land and the question as to the 
use of the sewers by those several pieces of land in determin-
ing whether or not any assessment should be made by the 
board on account of sewers? 
A. '\Ve have not done that until the recent de-
page 37 ~ cision of the court. 
Q. By virtue of that decision in the Southern 
Railway Company case you have had to go back and recon-
sider-
A. Re-examine all the assessments for sewer taxes. 
Q. For 1939 and 1940? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have met many problems of fact in connection 
with those assessments, have you not T 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have had to determine whether or not the facts 
in each particular case were such as to justify the sewer tax 
assessment, have you not? 
A. That is correct, sir. 
Q. vVhy have you not taken such action with respect to the 
taxes for the year 1938? 
A. Because .. we were acting under an opinion of the City 
Attorney that we only had a right to go back to 1939 and 1940 
to m~k~ any refund. 
Q. If you had to determine the question now as an origi-
nal proposition as to 1938, you would run into the same ques-
tions of fact in each case, would you not Y 
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A. Certainly. 
Q. Who assesses the sewer taxes in the City of Richmond 
since 1937? 
A. Our board does. 
Q. Do you have a particular deputy assigned to 
page 38 ~ that duty? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is his title! 
A. It is now under the Special Assessments department or 
clerk. 
Q. How long has that been the situation? 
A. That has been in operation for about a year. 
Q. ,v ere the records of the Commissioner of the Revenue 
and the Department of Finance that were in existence prior 
to 1938 transferred to your office Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In so far as sewer tax assessments are concerned? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Were the land books transferred to your office? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Where are the 1938, '39 and '40 land books now? 
A. In our office. 
Q. Are there any such books in the office of the Commis-
sioner of the Revenue f 
A. Not as I know of. 
Q. Have there been any such books with respect to the 
sewer tax assessments in the office of the Department of 
Finance or the Commissioner of the Revenue since January 
1, 1938? 
A. Not as I know of. 
page 39 ~ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. What date did you say you were appointed? 
A. November 1, 1937. 
Q. "\Vhen did your board actually finish the work of assess-
ing real estate for the year 1938, do you recall? 
A. About February 1st of 1938 because we had to write 
the bills up by that time. We had those two months N ovem-
ber and December to make a sort of running start-Novem-
ber, December, January and February. 
Q. Through what process did you go in assessing real es-
tate? Just what does your board dot 
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1\fr .. Miller: We object unless he is referring to the sewer 
taxes because I don't see what connection that has with this 
case. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: The purpose of the question is compara-
tive to show what they did to assess the real estate tax-
The Court: I will let you ask the question and if I think 
later it is not proper I will strike it out. 
A. Our board takes the city maps, which we have copies 
of, and we have individual plot cards for each one of the 
properties and those cards are arranged in blocks. The 
whole board has gone over the town, over the 
page 40 }- streets and sometimes alleys ; take the card out, 
look at the house, sometimes go in it, and then 
come back and assess the value for the land and the value for 
the building on the property and record that on the individual 
property card, from which card the land tax rolls are. made 
up. 
Q. You were formerly in the real estate business, were you 
noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. For how many years? 
A. About twenty. 
Q. And another member of your board is Mr. Roland Lig-
gan T 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he was in the real estate business how long? 
A. A good long time ; ten or fifteen years. 
Q. So you both are accepted as experts in the appraisal 
of real estate T 
A. By virtue of holding the office we have, I suppose so. 
·Q. You were prior to taking your office, were you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now the assessment of real estate for the ad valorem 
tax involves an appraisal of the property, doesn't iU 
A. That is correct, sir. 
Q. The third member of the board is who? 
A. Mr. R. M. Anderson. 
Q. He is a contractor, isn't he, or was T 
page 41 ~ A. Yes, sir, was. 
Q. And his expert knowledge is utilized by the 
board in the determination of the value of improvements T 
A. That is correct, sir. 
Q. Niow through what process does the board go in as-
sessing the sewer tax f 
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A. The sewer tax is assessed from the calculation of the 
number of feet shown on the individual property card which 
we check with the land books to make it as near correct as 
you can make it and just calculate it at 10 cents per front 
foot on each frontage on the street in which the sewer line 
is located, which is the front footage. 
Q. Does that require any expert knowledge to assess the 
sewer taxf 
A. I think not. 
Q. The properties involved in this petition were all unim-
proved during the entire year 19381 
A. Absolutely; no buildings on them. 
Q. And not connected with the city sewer so far as you 
knowf 
A. So far as I know. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
page 42 ~ By Mr. Miller: 
Q. ·wm you explain in detail just what yon did 
in examining the records in your office to determine whether 
the properties involved in this suit were such as in your 
opinion did not use the sewer Y 
A. Well, in all of them except two-this was done; when the 
decision was handed down by the Supreme Court we were in-
structed to make the proper credit memorandums. '\Ve went 
through our books and every property was listed which had 
no improvements listed, only vacant lots, and we took that 
sewer tax off and gave a credit memorandum for it. After 
that was done then we got the list of those taxes which had 
been paid from the City Collector and went over the books 
again and gave a refund slip which had to be presented to 
the Court by signing of the applicant for all those lots which 
were in 1939 without improvements on our land books. Then 
eame up the question on some of them as to whether there 
was a portion of a lot or a lot which had had an improvement 
on it which had been demolished. Those had to be investi-
g·ated each one separately and the determination made as to 
whether it was a possible use of the sewer there or not. That 
was the procedure. 
Q. Now in considering each of these lots you have elimi-
nated all of those possibilities by examination of 
page 43 ~ records, have you not V 
A. That is correct, sir. 
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Q. You have in your office a card file with respect to every 
parcel of land in the City of Richmond, do you not T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That shows in great detail the information as to any im-
provements that exist 1 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. And shows also what relation that lot bears to the ad-
joining properties, does it not? 
.A.. Yes, sir; each block is put together as a unit of a map. 
Q. And have you not had cases where you would have a 
house on one lot and adjoining it on one side a vacant Jot and 
adjoining that in the same direction a lot with other im-
provements on it and all three lots owned by the same tax-
payer? 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q ... A.nd one of the difficulties you have had is to determine 
whether or not that middle lot was, in fact, using the sewer! 
A. That is correct, sir; numbers of cases of: that kind. 
Q. And in arriving at the decision of this case that none 
of these lots use the sewer you have considered 
page 44 ~ those possibilities insofar as the records of your 
office show, have you not? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court: 
Q. I presume, Mr. Saville, you have a land hook of the City 
of Richmond for the vear 1938 f 
.A. Yes, sir. ~ 
Q. The assessments which appear on that book were made 
at what time! 
A. They were made during the year 1938. 
Q. And the sewer tax was made on that hook during the 
vear 1938? 
·- .A. That is correct, sir. 
Q. I don't know that this has anything to do with this case, 
but suppose there was a corner lot that fronted 50 feet on one 
street and 100 feet down the other street nnd there was a 
Emwer in front or a sewer by the 50 feet and a 8ewer by the 
100 feet; how would yon assess that lot l 
A. vVe would assess that in the wav the lot had been de-
scribed as being 50 hy 100 on the street first named, the way 
the description read from the original deed l'ecordation. 
°\Vhere they were conveyed by a block number in a subdivision 
we had to look up the block number of the subdivision to 
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see which way the natural frontage was and assess 
page 45 ~ it that way. 
Q. In other words, the chanr.es are that you as-
sessed it from the smaller number of feet¥ 
A. More than likely. I don't know of any case where the 
large frontage was assessed. 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. Hazelgrove : vV e rest. 
Mr. Miller: That is all the testimony. 
· Mr. Hazelgrove: If Your Honor please, as I 
page 46 ~ understand the position of the City Attorney from 
the opinion he has given, there are two disputes be-
t,veen us in this matter. First of all, we contend that this is 
a tax on real estate; the City Attorney takes the position that 
it is not a. tax on real estate. Secondly, the City Attorney 
takes the position that even if it is a tax on real estate that 
the recovery back of any portion of the ta.x is dependent, not 
upon section 414 of the Tax Code, as ,ve claim it is, but ac-
cording to the provisions of an act approved March 25, 1936, 
page 440, the Acts of 1936, creating this board of permanent 
Assessors for the City of Richmond because the act is lim-
ited in its scope to cities containing more than 175,000, which 
eliminates all of the State except the City of Richmond, in 
which it is provided that any person or any such city ag-
grieved by any such assessment may apply for relief within 
one year from the 31st day of December of the year in which 
such assessment is made. 
Now we have searched in vain for any case that would give 
an accurate definition of what is a license tax and what is a 
real estate tax. This tax is imposed pursuant to the constitu-
tion of the State of Virginia which provides that no city or 
town or county shall impose any tax or assess-
page 47 ~ ment upon abutting land owners for street or other 
public improvements except for either the con-
struction or for the use of sewers and the same when imposed 
shall not be in connection with the peculiar benefits resulting-
therefrom to such abutting land owners. That appears in 
Section 170 of the Constitution of Virginia and, pursuant to 
that constitutional grant of authority, the legislature has 
placed in the charter of the City of Richmond Section 19 i, 
Acts of 1926, Chapter 318, the following language: "The 
City Council may likewise construct sewers, culverts, or drains-
under the streets, alleys or other public places in the city and 
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may compel the use thereof, and may cause to be assessed 
upon the real estate benefited thereby the expense of such con-
struction, to the extent of the peculiar benefits resulting there-
from to such abutting land owners. In lieu of such assess-
ment "-and this is what the city has done; it has followed 
this language-'' In lieu of such. assessment, they may assess 
and collect compensation for the use of such sewers, culverts 
or drains, whether the same be actually used or not, and com-
pel the payment of such compensation.'' 
Now we say that language, following as it does the grant 
of authority to the City of Richmond to assess upon the real 
estate benefited thereby the expense of the construction, that 
this language in any fair interpretation and in-
page 48 ~ terpreting it, as we must, in favor of the taxpayer, 
when it follows and says or they may in lieu of 
such assessment assess upon the real estate and collect com-
pensation for the use of the sewer, being that it is a burden on 
the real estate. 
Now in the ·case of So,u.thern Railivay v. City of Richmond, 
with which Your Honor I know is familiar, in 8 S. E. 721, 
the City of Richmond pursuant to that grant of authority had 
passed an ordinance that assessed this tax upon the abutting 
landowner and it had assessed the tax, not only for the use 
of the sewer, but for the privilege of using the sewer. The 
privilege of using the sewer would, of course, have been a 
pure license tax, but the Supreme Court in the Southern Rail-
way case said no, they could not assess a privilege tax, it had 
to be a tax for the actual use, and the Court held that so much 
of the ordinance that assessed the tax for the privilege of 
using the sewer merely because the sewer was actually laid in 
the street adjacent to the property and available for use-
then that much of it was void as being invalid as being in 
conflict with Sect.ion 170 of the Constitution which limited 
the right to assess tlie property of the abutting landowner for 
the construction of the sewer or for the use of it, and they 
held that the use meant the actual use and not the privilege 
of the use. 
Now the ordinance under which the assessment 
pa.ge 49 ~ is made provides: "Hereafter, in every case in 
which no assessment"-that is an error in thP 
City Code; the word "no'' is left out, but I think it is in the 
original ordinance. 
J\tir. Miller: It is conceded by all it should be in there. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: ''Hereafter, in every case in which no 
assessment has been heretofore made to pay for the construc-
tion of a sewer, under the ordinances in force in regard to 
such assessments, the owners of lots which, according to the 
' \_ ...... 
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plan of the City, adjoin by the front, rear or side, a street or 
alley in which there is a sewer owned by the City, and every 
sewer hereafter constructed or acquired by the City of Rich-
mond, under·· any ordinance or resolution of the Council, or 
acquired by the city of Ri~hmond by purchase or by virtue of 
the annexation of territory into which it is practicable to en-
ter and where the city water is available, shall annually pay 
to the city, as compensation for the privilege of using such 
s¢er, a sum equal to ten cents per front foot." 
V -Now that tax, if Your Honor please, we say is not a license 
tax because it is not a privilege tax. Of course, there are a 
great many taxes that you pay that are actually paid for the 
privilege of doing a certain thing, but the administrative 
practice in the City of Richmond in delegating or 
page 50 ~ in leaving that to the Board of Assessors, who have 
control only over real estate, shows that the City 
of Richmond construes that to be a real estate tax and we 
shall attempt to show Your Honor that in the same ordinance 
imposing that tax the City itself recognizes that that is a tax 
on real estate because, Your Honor, it is made a burden on 
real" estate; it is made a lien on the land, which is not true of 
license taxes. They are not made a lien on the business until 
the City proceeds by the process given to them of levy to 
make it a lien, but this is as automatic a lien as is the ad 
valorem tax on real estate. 
Now the City can and has extended its mains beyond the 
city limits and they have provided for a tax to be paid by that 
non-resident living in the suburbs for the use of the city sewer 
and that provision contains a method by which the city col-
lects it as a tax and, of course, the non-resident owner agrees 
to that when he connects with the city sev,rer, but on the non-
resident the city ordinance provides that the rate to be 
charged for permission to use the City sewer by non-resident 
owners shall be $5.00 for the connection and then $5.00 a year, 
and then the ordinance contains this language: '' The said 
annual charge shall be paid as personal city taxes are paid.'· 
As personal city taxes are paid, why1 Because 
page 51 ~ that property is not with.in the corporate limits of 
the City of ~ichmond and they could not make it 
a lien as they have with respect to the sewer tax on property 
lying within the corpor te limits of the City of Richmond. 
So we say to Your H nor, and I am sorry we have such a 
lack of authority to dis ·nguish between what is a license tax 
and what is a real estat tax, that you cannot get any impres-
sion from reading this rdinance but ·what this is a burden on 
the real estate, collecti le just as real estate taxes are col-
lected, different in no essential elements from real estate 
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taxes. It does not impose the tax upon the tenant in posses-
sion who is actually using the sanitary sewers of the City 
of Richmond. If it were a license tax, it would be imposed 
just as a license upon a man who occupies the property of an-
other and conducts a business therein ; there is no tax on the 
owner of that property for that business, but it is on the ten-
ant in possession because it is a personal license. Now if 
this was a personal license on the person actually using the 
sewer, it would be imposed and collected from the tenant in 
possession who is actually placing a servitude upon the sani-
tary sewer; but here it is imposed upon the real estate itself, 
made a lien on the real estate for which the owner may lose 
his title if he fails to pay it. 
The Court: I don't know that you have, but 
page 52 ~ have you found any instance where the City of 
Richmond has tried to collect these license taxes 
by subjecting the land to the payment of the tax? 
}Ir. Hazelgrove: I will say this, Your Honor, and this is 
not a stipulation; I am just talking by way of argument, that 
the general practice-can't say universal-the general prac-
tice is that when land is sold for the non-payment of taxes 
it is always for the non-payment of the real estate tax plus 
the sewer tax because nobody would come down and pay the 
sewer tax alone. If it were a license, they would cut the 
sewer off and wouldn't let him use it; it would be illegal to 
use the sewer. It is not illegal to use the sewer if you do not 
pay the tax; there is a penalty which goes on it and, as we 
have stipulated, the same penalty that goes on the real estate ._........... 
tax. But there are cases where there is a sewer tax and no 
real estate tax and they are cases of charitable institutions 
because they are not liable for the ad valorem tax on real 
estate, but they are liable for the special assessment on the 
real estate for peculiar benefits. ~ 
Mr. Miller: May I ask a question in respect to the ,Judge's 
question f Do you know w·hether or not the City has attempted 
to enforce the collection of the sewer tax on tax-
page 53 ~ exempt property out of the property owners them-
selves as distinguished from enforcing it against 
the property itself? 
:Mr. Hazelgrove: No, sir, I don't know of any instance and 
I don't know of any instance wl1ere they have attempted to 
collect the real estate tax from the owner. I notice they say 
they are going to do it, but I don't think they will because T 
don't think they can. They have authorized it to be done~ but 
I don't think they will because they have gotten very good 
results by threatening. 
lfr. Miller: May I interrupt you just a minutef It is quite 
' 
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unusual, I realize, but arising out of the question the Court 
asked I would like to have the privilege of finding out and 
proving very promptly to what extent if any, the City has 
made claim against the property owner for the payment of a 
sewer tax only where there was no real estate tax due by 
the owner but where the sewer tax was assessed and claimed 
by the City. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: I shall gladly agree that evidence can 
be put in at any stage of the proceeding. 
The Court: I not only grant you that privilege, but direct 
both of you to try to find out that fact. 
Mr. Miller: Do you know the answer, Mr. 
page 54 ~ Smith? ,vm you be kind enough to ask Mr. Arm-
strong if he has made such claim t 
Mr. Florance: They advertised the real estate for sale for 
sewer tax only. 
Mr. Miller: I am talking about a suit to enforce it. I be-
lieve and hope to be able to prove that the City has made a 
personal claim against the property owner separate and dis-
tinct from a lien. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: You mean by personal claim in writing 
them a letter by Mr. "\Voodson. He has written a lot of those, 
but I mean brought suit. 
The Court: Let me explain what I have in mind. I recog-
nize neither of you gentlemen know how many suits the City 
of Richmond has ever brought for various tl1ings, but what 
I had in mind was whether either of you knew of any case 
where there is a suit in which this sewer tax was claimed by 
the city as a lien on the land, either whether the city brought 
a suit just to collect this sewer tax or whether it was a par-
tition suit or any other kind of suit where in that suit the City 
took the position that this tax was a lien on the land or 
whether the city in that suit just took the position this was 
a debt and not a lien on the land. That is what I 
page 55 ~ want. 
Mr. Miller: If Your Honor please and if coun-
sel will permit me, I am forced to say that the City has always 
claimed that the sewer tax was a lien on the land because the 
statute so provides and it has been enforced that way, but I 
would like also to be able to prove the corollary of that and 
the converse of it, namely: that the City claims the sewer tax 
out of the property owner when the property itself is not 
liable for any tax. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: You claim the real estate taxes are a 
personal obligation, don't you? 
Mr. Miller : That is my personal opinion. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: But you have not brought any suit? 
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Mr. Miller: I do not know that there has been any request 
for a personal judgment in suits brought to enforce those 
elaims. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: Now, if Your Honor please, in the case 
of Richmond & Allegheny R. R. Co. v. City of Lynchburg, 81 
Va. 473, the court had before it a special assessment for a 
water main. That case on the facts is not an authority here 
because in that case it provided that there would 
page 56 ~ be a tax for the construction of the main until the 
property was actually connected with the main and 
then the water service charge would take the place of the tax 
and there would be no tax, and the petitioner in that case 
claimed its constitutional rights were being violated and it 
was being discriminated against, but the court said this about 
that special assessment tax: '' The burden is thus placed on 
the property, the value of which is enhanced by the expendi-
tures that are made, which is a far more equitable apportion-
ment than if placed on the entire property within the limits of 
the city. And for the same reason the burden may be placed 
on real estate alone, which, unlike personalty, being immov-
able in its nature, is more peculiarly and permanently bene-
fitted. '' 
A special assessment which the court found was a burden on 
ihe real estate and, of course, if it is a lien on the real estate, 
as the City Attorney concedes and as the ordinance provides 
it is a lien on the real estate, then, of course, it is a burden on 
the real estate and we say, therefore, is a tax on the real es-
tate and is not a license tax against the occupant, but it is 
made a lien on the land itself, differing in no particular what-
ever from the ad valorem tax except in the mechanics neces-
sary for this assessment. 
· Now says the City Attorney under the acts of 
page 57 ~ 1936-,and, by the way, if Your Honor should look 
this up you can't find it in the 1940 supplement to 
the Code because when Michie put out that Code with his 
customary inaccuracy he goes back to the 1932 act and ignores 
the 1936 act, but the 1936 act, which has been amended by the 
1940 act, but in no particular material to this controversy, it 
eays that: '' In cities containing more than one hundred and 
seventy-five thousand inhabitants' '-I will omit any imma-
terial part-'' may in lieu of the method now prescribed by 
law, provide for the annual assessment of real estate for local 
taxation, and to that end may elect. one or more persons to 
assess such real estate for taxation, and the council or other 
governing body in such cities may prescribe the duties of such 
person or persons and fix his or their compensation. • "" • 
.All duties now devolved upon the commissioner of revenue 
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with respect to the assessment of real estate and making up 
the land books in such cities, shall be transferred to and de-
volved upon the assessor or assessors to be appointed pur-
suant to this act.'' Now says this 1936 act: '' All such real 
estate shall be assessed at its fair market value.'' 
Now that is the primary duty of these assessors and when 
the act of 1936 refers to the assessment of real estate it means 
the appraisal of the real estate for purposes of local taxation 
on an ad valorem tax because it describes what 
page 58 ~ they shall do ; '' All such real estate shall be as-
sessed at its fair market value, and taxes for each 
year on such real estate shall be extended by such assessor or 
assessors on the basis of the last assessment.'' 
Now says section 3: "Any person or any such city ag-
grieved by any such assessment' '-for the ad va.lorem tax; 
there could be no application for relief from this sewer tax 
except upon the ground ,ve are urging or upon a mathemati-
cal inaccuracy. It is entirely automatic; there is no assess-
ment, no appraisal to be ma.de for the sewer tax; just a simple 
problem of arithmetir, as 1\fr. Saville frankly stated. 
So we say to Your Honor that when it says: "Any person 
aggrieved by any such assessment may within one year apply 
for relief" it refers to the appraisal upon which the minds 
of reasonable men might differ and does not refer to a purely 
automatic thing, such as the extension of the smver tax on an 
entirely automatic ba.Ris, and our position is that section 414 of 
the Tax Code of Virginia is the applicable statute and not the 
act of 1936, and under 414 we are limited to two years, which 
include the year 1938, whereas under the 1936 act, applicable 
only to the City of Richmond, it includes only one year; and 
at the same session at which this act ,,.,.as passed-I think this 
is pertinent; Mr. ·witt just called it to my mind-
page 59 r that at the same 1936 session of the legislature that 
enacted this act applicable only to the City of Rich-
mond they re-enacted Section 414 of the Tax Code and did 
not say in there : '' Rut this shall not a.pply to the City of 
Richmond.'' There is no exception in 414. 
If Your Honor would like to have this before you while 
Mr. Miller is talking, here is the 1936 act. It was amended in 
1940, but the amendment plays no part in this matter. 
I would like to point out, as Your Honor well knows, it 
is a well settled principle in construing tax laws they must 
be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer: Coni. v. Vir-
.r1inia. Electric.& Power Conipa.ny, 159 Va. 655. 
Mr. Miller: I would like first to dispose of two points 
made by Mr. Hazelgrove just in closing and they are, first, 
that the 1936 act auth01·faes the correction where there has 
55 
been an erroneo1.1~ asses~n.1~nt; in oth~r wqrqs, ~s he ~~ys, 
wliere it was a simple pro~leµi 9f arith:metie. It is eqµally 
just as simple a nrobl~m of arithmeti~ to cqrr~ct the ~:r:-
roneous assessrr1ent of r~al estate ,yhere there h~$ peen an 
assess:µi ... ~nt of 10. 0 feet of la ..nd. · when, ll-s a matt~r 9£ fa~tf th~r.e. 
fll'~ o:qly 90 feet there. Th~t is just as simple ~ m-·()b. ~in qf 
· arithruettc ~~ tP cnrrect the errqnep11s sewer ta.x~ 
page 60 ~ ~µd if his ~-rgllm~nt f~ soun¢l as to t~~t ~:nd ypu 
' · c~:r 't come lmq.er the 1936 f}Ct unleijs yo11 have got a 
pr0Nen1 pf appraisal, then yq~ can't pprpe in under p1~t _ a~t 
1yhen you h&ye a m~:q f)~sess~p 1vfth 100 fe~t of lanµ ~t $10.QO 
a f.qqt ~vhe:r, as ft. matt~r of fact, ~is deeq and titlf3 i~ o?1Y 
for .90 feet of lqnd b,eca.Hs~ that is simply ~ proble:rri qf ar1th:-
nmhc~ · 
1'! ow tn tpe 1936 act ~e s~ys th~t it dic1 npt-that in t:Jie 
~lllendrn~nt by th~ 19~~r act of Se~ti9n 414 of the T~* Cqde 
npthing \ym, said 1vith · respect to the aµ1erid1ne:µt ·n.ot ~pplyhlg 
tQ the City of ijich1µond. · I insist th~t up.on a pl~in te~r:fo1g 
of tJw 1936 act ,vhe.reby the Board of Assessors in th~ City pf 
}liclm1qw:l WflS created anq a11thorized it proyides in the ~a~e 
~ecthn1 relating to limitation of time that the procedur~ ip. 
sue~ cas~s spall be in the' m~nner pres~ribed PY sectio11 fH of 
t~~ Tqx Ood~ of Virginia and in the very last cla~1se it says : 
'Anq ~H other acts or pa.rts of acts in conflict with this a~t 
ar~ · tp th~ e~tent of Sl1Gh cm1flict, herepy repealed.'' · · 
ij qw tlrnre is a plain conflict in the 1936 enabling a~t aµfi 
the i936 ~mendme~t to 4:J.t with respect to the limitatiqn of 
time and it is one yea1· in the 1936 aGt a.pd two years ~s to 
real ~st~te ~lsewh~re in the ~tate of Virginia under section 
414, but the 1936 ~nalJ.ling a~t says that the procedure shall 
. be the same as prescribed in 414. 
page 61 ~ Now as Yqµr f!pnor is thorougl~lv familiar with 
t]1~ principles 9f the Squthern ltaihvay C!lse, it i~ 
not nec~ssary for us tq recon&ider the question of the validity 
of the sewer tax in th~ City qf Ri~~mond in ge~eral.. It is 
conceded a~ a matter of lipv the 1939 ~ssessment m this case 
is erron~6us ~ncl shoulq. be refunded~ It is contended, npw-
ever, that the l 938 assessm~:p.t, w~ile it may be erronequs 
insofar as the constitutional validity of the assessment is 
concerned. t}wre i~ nQ authorjty in any court to grant ~ re-
fund. I think it is well ~ettled iµ Virginia that an application 
for tqe refund of tax~~ is a stijt,utory right and can b~ exer-
ci'sed only insofar as the statute authorizes it and that no re-
lief can b~ given with re~pect to ta*es unless the statute au-
thorizes it;· ·of course, unless you rely upon the comnw:µ la.w 
rem~dy as to -protest ancl :µpti· ceJo the officer and suit against 
the officer. That is not invo ve here. 
I • ' ,•' ' ' , 
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As far as this case is concerned the petitioner is out of 
court unless the statute authorizes the relief and we say that 
the limitation of time is a limitation of the right and not a 
limitation of the remedy, and I can cite Your Honor to au-
thorities in support of that view. It is a perfectly well set-
tled principle in Virginia that the court can do nothing more 
than the statute authorizes and if we can't go back 
page 62 ~ but one year, then however inequitable the tax 
may be it cannot be refunded. There is authority 
in several jurisdictions, notably in Massachusetts, to the ef-
fect that statutes of limitation with respect to the assessment 
of taxes are equally applicable to void assessments for consti-
tutional reasons as to assessments erroneous on some other 
ground than a constitutional ground, assessments that might 
be voidable. I cite the case of Wheatland v. City of Boston, in 
Massachusetts, in Northeastern Reporter, and counsel on the 
other side has had the benefit of that authority. It has never 
been questioned and I think is followed in many jurisdictions. 
So if there is any doubt in your mind as to that principle of 
law I can give you ready reference to it. The specific refer-
ence to that case is Wheatland v. City of Boston, decided in 
1939-I am sure that is wrong because it is 88 N. E. 769: I 
think it was decided about 1889 or '99. That case plainly held 
in a case similar to this on the facts that a statute of limitation 
applies equally as well to a void assessment as to an assess-
ment erroneous on some other ground. So that if this assess-
ment is barred by the statute of limitations, this court has no 
jurisdietion to grant the relief. 
Now we consider what :fi.~es the limitation. This ne-
cessarily depends first upon the character of the 
page 63 ~ assessment. Your Honor is perhaps not as fa-
miliar with the method of tax assessing in the City 
of Richmond as he is in such other matters in other juris-
dictions, but under valid authority from the legislature under 
its charter the city of Richmond assesses many kinds of what 
we call privilege taxes or license taxes or excise taxes, dif-
ferently styled, differing from property taxes, some of which 
are assessed in other jurisdictions. 
The Court: Can you point me to any license tax in the City 
of Richmond that is made a lien on the real estate? 
Mr. Miller: Any license tax made a lien? 
The Court: You are claiming, I understand, this is a license-
tax. 
Mr. Miller : Does Your Honor mean business tax? 
The Court : Any license. 
Mr. Miller: Yes, sir, I think I can. I was on the point of 
reading Section 7 of Chapter 11 of the Richmond City Code 
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of 1937, relating to many kinds of such taxes and, as it is not 
so long, I would like to have the privilege of reading it: 
"That the assessments or apportionments for lo-
page 64 } cal or public improvements for which any owner 
is liable under proceedings taken under this chap-
ter, as well as under any agreement with the city; the rental 
charge assessed by the city for the occupation of portions of 
its streets by areas, vaults, entrances to basements or cellars, 
balconies, bay windows or other like projections over or ob-
structions in the sidewalks, streets, alleys or other public 
places or for any similar occupation of the streets of a per-
manent character; the rental charge for gasoline pumps or 
oil wells located on the sidewalks or streets of the city; the 
rental charge made by the city for the privilege of maintain-
ing electrical or other permanent signs which project six 
inches (6") or more over the streets, alleys or other public 
places of the city, the rental charge made by the city of ~ich-
mond against persons, firms or corporations owning, main-
taining or occupying show cases, fruit stands or other like 
obstructions in the streets or other public places of the city; 
and charges assessed against property owners annually for 
the privilege of connecting with and using sewers, culverts 
and drains maintained by the city of Richmond shall, as soon 
as the same become final, or annually where an annual charge 
is made, be entered and charged against each owner 
on suitable books to be kept for the purpose in the 
page 65 ~ office of the clerk of special assessments, which 
shall show the name of the ffwner, location and de-
scription of the property and the amount due by each owner, 
upon the entry of which as aforesaid by the said clerk of spe-; 
cial assessments l1e shall report the same in detail to the 
comptroller of the city of Richmond who shall make proper 
(-mtry thereof on the records of the city in his custody or un-
der his control and have bills for same prepared and placed 
in the hands of the collector of city taxes to be collected a.nd 
accounted for in the manner prescribed for the collection of 
other city taxes; provided, however, that the sums so ascer-
tained and charged for local public improvements as an an-
nual rental charge for the use of sewers, drains and culverts 
shall be a lien upon real estate so charged with said assess-
ment from the time when the work of improvement shall have 
been completed or from the time of the making of the sewer 
or pipe connection, and if not paid during the year in which 
the work of improvement shall have been completed or 
C'harged, the said assessment, apportionment or charge shall 
l1e added to the tax bill against said real estate on the first 
day of February of the ensuing year.'' 
'rl1~t is~ sectio11- whic~ ~poses m.~ny l~ds qf Itcen~e t~xes .. 
· Mr. Ha~elgrove: Yqu don't claim any of th~~ 
page 66 ~ are a lien. on the ·real estate exce'pt the ·sewer· tax, 
go you1 
Mr. lfiJier: The sewer ta~-th~ annuaj re11:t~l ~4arge for 
th~ u,se pf s~w~rs, q.r~i1:1s and culverts s:Ji~ll be ~ lien uporr 
I!eal estate. Mr. ffaz.~lgroye : T~t ~s th.e sewer t~x. Y qp don't claim. 
the ass~ssmeµ.t for puttmg 3: s1de1vall~ dqwp l:} license tµ.x, do 
y9µ f Th~fis o~e ppbli~ i.1nprqyement; qr paving ~n ~lley~ 
1\fr. Mtller: ~o~ that is nq~ a µcense tax. It ~s a charg~ 
mijde at the time of constructip:n. 
ifr. :f.I~zelgrqve: I mean is. th~t your E},nS'~yer tp Judge 
,vilson 's q~est~ou f The ~rµijwer is no, unl~ss the sewer tax is 
a license tax! 
¥r. Miller: I don't k~ow whether t4e area t~x- . 
~fr. Hazelgrove: That is not mad~ a lien. Sewers, drµ.ms 
and culverts are the only ones. . . 
' ~fr. Miller:. I think the answ~r to Judge ,vil~on 's q-µes-
tiqn is nq. I would like to ask Mr. Saville if he knows any 
o·t}ler ·qr.dinance l could ref er to. The only ·fo.x made ~ part pf 
· · · the lien on real estate is the tax for the charge 
page 67 ~ for the use of the sewers and culverts and drains. 
· Now the duties of the special assessment tax 
were first 1.1:µder ~- clerk appointed by the Comptroller and µn-
der the Uep~rtment pf Finance, but by virtue of the enabling 
&ct of 1936 and the city ordinance passed pursuant thereto the 
duties of this special assessment t~x were transferred to the 
~oard 9f Re~I Estate Assessors. I have some copies of a 
city ordin~nce which was adopted pursuant t9 the ~nabling 
act and I thinl{ I can facilitate matters if I show this to Your 
~orior. The secp~d sheet is an amendment whi~h I do· not be-
It1eve is ~aterial to the issues here-the amendment of A~gust 
3. st. 
Mr,. Fl prance : Is t}lpt the same ena-1:>ling act¥ 
Mr. ¥i1ler: This is an ordinance. The only enabling act 
that is authority for this ordinance which I have just handed 
ypµ, pnd wht~li is ordinflnce ''A'', f1pprqved Aµg"llst 5, 19~7, 
is th~ act of the G~neral Assembly of 1936 found iµ the 19SQ 
voluJ:ll.e at nage 440, whi~h is the one Mr. Ha~elgroye read, and 
in that act the council was authprized to provide for the an-
nµ~~ ~ss~i:,sµi~nt of r~al estate for loc~l ta~ation and to that 
end may elect one or m~H'e p~:rsons to assess s11ch real estate 
fqr. t~xation a11-d m~y lilrnwj~e provide for such cleric~l as-
. 1:?ista11ts and such ot4er e~penses as may be prop-
p~g~ 68 ~ erly incident ther~to. 
· Npw i11- tp.e orqin~nce approyecJ August 5, 1935, 
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se,ction 9 tµereof on page four is as follows: . '' That the duties 
of the clerk o~ Special As~essments, now under the control and 
direction of the Comptroller of the City of Richmond, be and 
the same are hereby transferred to t~e said assessors t_ogether 
with all records pertaini_ng to said 9ffice.'' JOU will find just 
above there in section 7 that all of the duties now devolved 
upon the Commissioner of Revenue with respe~t to the as-
sessment of real estate in the City of Richmond shall be trans-
ferred to, performed by a;nd devolved upon ~he assessors 
herein provided for ~nd the Commissioner of Revenue is 
!lerehy authori~ed and directed to del_iver to the assess9rs 
herein provided fqt, as soon as practicable after the first day 
9f September, 1937, all books and other records relating to all 
former assessme1its of real estate. 
So that under the authority of the i936 enabling act of the, 
qeneral Assembly the council has tran~ferred to the Board of 
Real Est~te Assessors all of the duties with respect to the 
Commissioner of Revenue and all of the duties of the clerk of 
the Speciai Assessments, wh1eh embrace the duties of mak-
ing the assessments of .land and the duties of assessing sewer 
taxes, and from an~ after August 5, 1937, the only authority 
in the City of Richmond that could make such as-
page 69 ~ sessments was the Board of Real Estate Assessors 
and the only auth.ority for the Board of Real Es-
tate Assessors to exist is under the act of 1936, page 440, and 
you will see in that very act itself that all of the duties now 
devolved upon the Com~issioner of the Revenue with respect 
to the assessment of real estate and making up the land books 
in such cities shall be transferred to and devolved upon the 
assessor or assessors to be appointed pursuant to this act. 
Now the assessment of sewer taxes in the City of Richmond 
has been in existence for many years and it was generally 
known in Richmond: the ordinances on their face sho,v that 
fact. ,,Then the 1936 act was adopted the General Assembly 
had notice of the existence of the city ordinances and the 
methods of assessing real estate and sewer taxes in the City 
of Richmond and they transferred the whole thing to the 
Board of Assessors from the Commissioner of Revenue. It 
is unique in Virg'inia so far. There is only one city in excess 
of 175,000 in population and Richmond is therefore the only 
city that has the method of assessing real estate prescrihed 
by this act, but that method was well known and in vogue for 
many years and when they transferred all of the duties of tlw 
Commissioner of Re-venue with respect to the assessment of 
real estate and making up the land books in such cities to the 
Board of Assessors thev naturally transferred nll 
page 70 ~ of the duties of the Special Assessments clerk, par. 
ticularly when you read that provision in the en-
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abling act together with the preceding section authorizing the 
board to appoint such clerks and assistants as might be neces-
sary to carry out their duties. 
So that the city takes the position that the 1938 and subse-
quent sewer taxes have been assessed under the enabling act 
of 1936 by the Board of Real Estate Assessors and by no one 
~lse and that is the only kind of assessment that is in the 
record here. 
The Court: Let me ask a question right here. For the pur-
pose of this question let's forget 1938 and think only about 
1939. Suppose there was a piece of property in Richmond 
assessed at $1,000.00, owned by John Smith, and that was a 
fair assessment of that property, and suppose John Smith 
wanted to be relieved of this sewer t~"<; how could he pro-
ceed? 
Mr. Miller: He actually in practice has applied to the Hust-
ings Court of the City of Richmond. There were some 2,500 
-there is no objection to my stating this in the record? 
Mr. Hazelgrove: No. 
Mr. Miller: It is only argument. There was 
page 71 ~ filed in this Court last week, I think, some 2,500 
or nearly 3,000 separate applications by individuals 
who own property in exactly the same category as the peti-
tioner here, seeking relief from the 1939 se·wer tax, and by a 
rather unique procedure we filed a petition on behalf of the 
city, asking that all of those be considered together and that 
on~- blanket entry be made directing the refund and there was 
a)iout $9,000.00 of 1939 sewer taxes refunded. 
t/ The Court: Suppose one of those suits had been contested 
and suppose the evidence in the case showed that there had 
been a fair assessment of this property and that the $1,000.00 
was a fair assessment on it, how could that petitioner be re·-
lieved under this act here at page 440? 
Mr. Miller: Because the sewer tax-I don't think it comes 
under 440. The City maintains 414 of the Tax Code is the 
place for him to come in, that it is a license tax an~n t a 
property tax, but assuming it is a property tax, then he omes 
in under this 1936 act on page 440~ 
The Court: I mean if he comes in under this enabling act 
here and if that is to govern this individual's right and Mr. 
Saville had gotten on the stand and said that "$1,000.00 was 
the assessment he put on it," and the individual 
page 72 ~ had gotten on the stand and said, "I have no ob-
jection to that $1,000.00 assessment,'' how could 
he come under section 3 here of this act when it says any per-
son or any such city aggrieved by such ass·essmenU How 
could he get any relief? 
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Mr. Miller: Because Mr. Saville would have testified that 
the assessment was $10 .. 00 a foot on 100 feet and 10 cents a 
foot on 100 feet sewer tax or $10~00 and the petitioner would 
have countered by saying, ''We concede the assessment for 
the real estate tax, but we deny the right to claim the sewer 
tax because the Court of Appeals says you can't do it." 
The Court: But, as I understand it, the man that owns a 
50 foot front lot would pay the same sewer tax whether Mr. 
Saville assessed that lot at $1,000.00 or assessed it at $100.00; 
isn't that correct! 
Mr. Miller: That is true. The sewer tax is graduated ac· 
cording to the front foot frontage and not according to 
value. 
The Court : My question is how could he be relieved under 
the erroneous assessment of property when there has been 
110 erroneous assessment. 
lVIr. Miller: The only theory would be that the 
page 73 } assessment of property embraces the assessment 
of a sewer tax in connection with the use· of that 
property. Now if that assessment is made, there has been 
an erroneous assessment of property. If the sewer tax is 
a tax assessed in connection with the use of property and is 
not a property tax, that the only way he could get any re-
lief is under 414 of the Code relating to license taxes and 
it is the .City's position this is the section this petitioner 
should proceed under. It is not necessary in his petition 
to alleg·e which section of the law he comes under and the 
petition does not show, of course, but the City has claimed 
throug·hout these matters that the proper procedure is un-
der section 414 of the Tax Code. The mind of man has not 
yet devised a perfect tax system and the Virginia law is 
certainly not perfect and in the enactment of 414 of the Tax 
Code the legislature of Yirginia could not have specified 
every kind of license tax, but we do say this is a kind of li-
cense tax, it is in the nature of a license tax. It is true it 
is on real estate and therefore burdens real estate, but it 
is equally true that it is demanded from the property owner 
where there is any real estate against which there is any 
claim and right here I am ready to prove Your Honor's ques-
tion as to that practice. Mr. Hasker is in court and I think 
this is a good place to introduce that additional 
pag·e 74 ~ evidence with the Court's permission. 
62 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
/' 
E.L.HASKER, _ . 
a witness called in behalf of the defendant, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By l\fr. Miller : . 
Q. You are :Mr. E. L. Hasker, the Collector of Delinquent 
Taxes for the City of Richmond t 
A. Yes. 
Q • .And you have been so engag·ed for many years¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. One of your duties is to enforce the collection of real 
estate taxes and sewer taxes, is it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is the practice of your office with respect to de-
matidirtg the payment of sewer taxes in cases where the 
sewer taxes have beeii assessed but the property is exempt 
fro1n propei'ty tax f 
A. We sent them not.ices regularly the same as we do real 
estate taxes. Then a.fter tha.t we have-so far we ar(} just 
beginning this l~st ten or brelve months to sue mahy of 
them for real estate and all other taxes on the 
page 75 ~ books. Up to this time we have never on these 
institutions sued them for any taxes. 
Q. :Mr. Hasker; it is a fact, is it not, that the office of the 
Collector of Delinquent Taxes is following now many dif-
ferent practic.es from what it_ has followed in the past with 
respect to the enforcement of claims? 
A. Altog·ether. Up until th~ last two years ,ve were al-
most a receiving office, rather than going out_ and compelling 
them to pa.y us. .Since the change of administration here 
recently we ate goin~: a.fter all of them. 
Q. ·So prior to 1938 it was not the practice of your office 
to proceed in the collection of any kind of tax? 
A. No. 
Q. And you a.re now proceeding to sue persons, firms or 
cotporations that owe sewer taxes ,but do not owe any real 
estate tax in ccmnection therewith? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There are those, cases in which there have been no real 
estate taxes assessed in connection with sewer taxes 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can vou give an illustration of property owners in-
volved in these matters? 
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A. We ha.ve one case we are getting ready for 
page 76 ~ court and we are waiting for an opinion of the 
City Attorney on the Crippled Children's Home, 
for instance. 
Q. You mean the crippled Children's Hospital Y 
A. Yes, sir, out on Brook Road, and that particular case 
we now have-we only go after the sewer ta.x. Of course, 
we won't have to sue because I just talked to the attorney a 
few minutes ago and they will pay in a very short time. 
Q. Aren't there some churches and other similal" organiza-
tions that owe sewer taxes that are called upon to pay Y 
A. Very many churches and very many eleemosynary in-
stitutions are in arrears and delinquent. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove : . 
Q. Mr. Hasker, how many years are you trying to go baek 
on those sewer taxes? 
A. We go back as far as 1916. 
Q. As far as 19161 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the City takes the position that the relief act that 
our able representative Mr. Hopkins g·ot through the legis-
lature of three yea.rs on personal taxes does not apply; is 
that righU 
A. Oh, no. 
Q. That does not applyi 
page 77 ~ A. No. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Don't you know that particular a.c.t relates specifically 
to personal property? 
A. They did not take off the sc}1ool tax, did not take off 
the sig11 tax or machinery tax; just took off the tangible per-
sonal property. 
' . 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hazelgrove: 
Q. Can you ten us a.ny person or :firm or corporation that 
has actually been sued? 
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A. Oh, my; I am putting 250 of them a week in the Civil 
,T ustice Court. 
Q. I am talking about sewer taxes. 
A. No, we haven't caught up; we have so much real estate 
and only started since Mr. Ambler's' ~~trol a~d started the 
new administration to work on. that.· · · · , ' : 
Q. And, as a matter of fact, yqu .have· brought 'no suit to 
recover sewer taxes alone? · · · · 
A. No, but we are getting ·ready to do so . iiow. . 
Q. That is under the charge of Mr. P~lip WhitfieldY 
A. He handles that mostly .. · - 1 · •• •.• 
. Q. He is a lawyer "i:h charge of that workY 
page 78 ~ A. Yes. :. . . . 1· · _ • • . 
Q. But, as far as you know, no actual suit has 
been brought? , . ,, , . , 
A. I know no action has been taken against these sewer 
taxes yet,. 1but we haye them in prepar~tion. I hav~ one in 
my pocket right now. . . . . 
Q. You don't know what position the taxpayer will take? · 
A. Most of them come across when we. push them hard 
enough. 
R.E-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Miller: 
·Q. What are your instructions in the event the taxpayer 
refuses to pay a sewer tax where there .is no· real estate. 
taxY 
A. My instructions are to place that ·particular case in 
the hands of the. City Attorney for. action. in the court to, 
compel him to pay; put up his proper.ty .for sale. I am not 
a lawyer. -.. . .. 
Q. Are your instructions to the City Attorney to put up 
the property for sale Y · . · · . . . 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you sure of that? 
A. I handle it exactly like I do the real estate taxes. 
Q. Which is to report it to the City Attorney with tbe re-
quest to bring the proper action Y , · ·. 
A. To, bring the proper act.ion. It is up to them· 
page 79 ~ to do what they see fit. 
Witness stood aside. 
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Mr. Miller:: I I think one of the strongest arguments to 
show that this is not a property tax is that there has alr.eady 
.been adjudicated the. fact that the area ta..i, akin to this, is 
not a property tax. . I· 1:.ef e·r to a proceeding in the Circuit 
Court of the City · o-f ·Richmond instituted on behalf of the 
Medical College of" Virginia against the City of Richmond 
whereby' a decree w·as enfered' by consent' of counsel for the 
parties ·relieving tne Conunoihvealth of Virginia and the Medi-
<ml College ·of Virginia from the payinerit o~ property taxes, 
but conceding the ·.liability for ·the area tax' in connection 
with the areas runiiirig from· tiui MemoriaI Hospital. Now 
that is a proceeding: in tlie· Circuit· Court 'of the City of Rich-
mond and I have liere a copy ( Qt the applicatfori and a copy 
of the order," wl:jfo~ are not ·c~rti:fied, but Luse them as a 
matter of argument simp(v; to shO'\\T that the· : . . . . . . . . Cir-
cuit Coiirt of the- City of Richmond-·· it.is tru_e;· by consent--
relieveq. the Meclic~1 College 'of· liahilit.y, from ·the property 
tax, but conceded the liability for the area. fax. 
Now I )mow the ·area ta.x is 11qt a li~n on land, but never-
. theless. it goes. to··· the character of, the tax; it is 
page 80 r i1;1 conri~tion with the use of the" land. and is con-
' nected through the same. source and same medium, 
except it is 110.t put on." the ·land hill-the reai · estate tax bill. 
put it is assessed by the ·special· Assessments clerk under the 
same authority that embraces.-the· sewer tax and just because 
it is put a lien on the land doe.s not. make .it any less a privi-
lege tax. ln fact, ·that is what the Supreme Court of. Ap-
peals said in the Southern Railway ·.Company case. They 
said that "The rule of constitution·a.1 and statuto.ry construc-
tion, the popular meaning. of the term 'for the use .of sewers;' 
and the context of this lang·uage in. the· constitution; compels 
the conclusion that the langua.ge means 'use in fact' or 
~ actual us.e' as contradiE?t.ing·uished f,rom 'privilege of using·' 
or 'available for use.' '' · Throughout the whole case it was 
treated as n: use tax and not a.s a property tax. . . 
. The Southern R.ailwa.y Compau¥, is assessed by the State 
Corporation Commission-its property is and the · enabling 
act. of the 1936 session pr_ovided that this act shall not apply 
to the assessment of a.ny real estate a.gsessed under the law 
by our State Corpora.ti on . !Commission. No assessment of 
sewer tB;xes was assigned an<ll I think- it would have been con-
ceded that if there had been anv use of the sewer b:v the South-
e.rn Railway that that .asseesment would hav:e ·been proper, 
although the property of the Southern Railway is assessed 
. -under the law by the State Corporation Commis-
page 81 ~ sion even now, even since the enabling act, and 
I think it wa·s a marked distinction between the 
66 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
assessment of the taxes on the property and the assessment 
of the property owner for the use of the sewer in connection 
with the pi·operty, and bear in mind, if Your Honor please, 
that the provision of the constitution which authorizes this 
assessment docs not put it upon the property. Section 170 
of the co~sti#1.tion only authorizes the assessment upon abut-
ting lando.wriers : ''No city or town or county shall impose 
any tax or a;sse.ssment upon abutting landowners for street 
or other public improvements, except for either the construc-
tion or for the use of the sewers". 
Now tbe only authority for the imposition of this ta.:x is 
Section 170 of the constitution and that puts it on the land-
owners. It does not say it cannot be made a lien on the 
real estate- and the city is not entitled to enforce its lien by 
-claiming the lien on the real estate. But the assessment i~ 
ag·ainst. the property owner by virtue of and on account of 
and in connection with the use of the sewer. 
l\fr. Hazelgrove: Is it your position that the real estate 
tax is a personal liability of the property ownert 
Mr. Miller: If Your Honor please, that ques-
pag-e 82 ~ t.ion has been raised and it is my personal judg-
ment-personal opinion that the real estate tax 
can be made a personal obligation against the property owner 
by virtue of the peculiar provision of Section 403 of the Tax 
Code, but as far as the position of the City Attorney's office 
is concerned there has been no definite stand tha.t I know 
of. We have discussed it in the office, but as far as I know 
there has been no suit instituted asking for a personal judg·-
ment over and above the value of the land that is liable for 
the tax. 
l\fr. Hazelgrove: But you concede for the purpose of this 
argument that the personal liability of the taxpayer does 
not prevent tl1e tax from being a tax on the thing? 
Mr. Miller: Why, of course, not. If I have a tax on 
my desk, I am personally lia.ble for the tax, but neverthe-
less it is a tax on a thing, 9ut just because there is a lien for 
the tax upon the tlling· does not make the tax upon the thing 
any different. 
Now Mr. Cooley in his fourth edition on Taxation, Vol. 1, 
at page 13.J,, section 45, under a discussion of the definition 
and nature of and kind of taxes, says this with respect to 
excise taxes : 
.// 
'' An excise tax, using the term in its broad 
pa·g-e 83 ~ meaning as opposed to a property tax, includes 
taxes sometimes designated by statute or referred 
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to as privilege taxes, license taxes, occupation taxes, and busi-
ness taxes: There is no clear line of demarkation between 
so-called 'license', 'oceupation' and 'privilege' taxes.' In the 
case of corporations, such taxes are often ref erred to as 
f ranchlse taxes. 
"Sometimes the term 'license fee' is used to distinguish 
an exercise of the police power f ro:m an exercise of the t&x-
ing. powe1~ referred to as a 'iicense tax'. -
" Generally the term 'excise tax' is used to distinguish 
such taxes from taxes on property. It is often ver·y irii-
portant to d~t~rmi:p.e wh~ther a certain t~x is ~ property tax 
or a,n e:xcis·~ tax, i. e., wh~ther (1) a property tax or (2} ai~ 
occupation, licepse, business, privilege or franchise tax." 
That is our prqbleni 4er<3. We have a statute refeq:ing 
to a property tax and in the same statute referring to a 
licens~ tax. VY~ have two pigeo}l.hqles. Our problem is to 
put this tax in one or th~ other pigeonhole. This affords 
no relief and in the event there is no relief the sewer tax 
as a whole fall's down because unless the taxpayer caii come 
in and get some relief the assessment. as a whole is erroneous. 
· .So if we cannot classify this tax and there is no 
pag·e 84 ~ reltef fqr this land, then the whole se,·ver tax in 
· the City of Richmond falls down, not only fo1· 
1938, but 1939 and 1940~ because there is no way for an)T-
body to come into court and get relief. You can see what a. 
serious situation that is and how it is a very important phast' 
of this case to classify the fa.x itself. That is the whole prob-
lem. As soon a.s you do that, you can find the solution by a 
reading of the statutes. 
The Court: State that again, please. 
l\ir. Miller: I have hi mind that the fact that if there is 
no way that one assessed with a. tax can complain of ~ri 
erroneous assessment, he il? deprived of his property with-
out due process of law. I am not assailing that. I think 
tlmt is a sound principle that is applicable here and I ust-1 
that as an illustration as to what might happen if we can--
not pigeonhole this tax. If we can't say that it belongs in 
on~ category or the other so J\,lr. Eu.bank can get relief, then 
he has 'no way to complain of an erroneous assessment and 
he and everybody else in tl1e City of Richmond assessed with 
a. sewer tax, whether using the' sewer or not, whether im-
proved or not, would be deprived of their property without 
clµ~ process of 1a".,: · becau.se. there would be no ··statutory 
m~tµocl set up for complauung- ~,bout the assessment of the 
I 
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sewer tax. So if this is not a property tax and not 
page 85 ~ a license tax, then where is the statute that grants 
the relief. He is not under the enabling act of 
1936 because that relates to property taxes, says the other 
side; he is not under 414 because that relates to both propJ 
erty and license taxes and it is neither one of those two. So 
if it is not either one of those two, it is void and every other 
tax in the City of Richmond is void in so far as it relates 
to sewers. 
''Not only are excise taxes governed by many rules en. 
tirely different from those which control property taxation, 
but also there are many constitutional provisions applicabl(,I 
to taxes on property, but not to excise taxes. For instance, 
an excise tax is not within constitutional prohibitions such as 
those requiring taxation of property by value, uniformity 
and equality of taxation. So such a tax is not objectionable 
as double taxation, although the property itself is also taxed.' 1 
If this is a property tax, then it has got to be unif 01m; 
if this is a tax on real estate, it has got to be uniform, and 
the real estate that uses a sewer is no different from the 
real estate that does not use a sewer. If the tax is on the 
property and if it is. a property tax, then it falls because it is 
not uniform; not only this tax, but every other sewer tax 
in the city. 
'' Generally the answer to the question of 
page 86 ~ whether a particular tax is a property ta.~ or an 
excise tax is so apparent that there is no room for 
argument; but in many phases the question has been the 
subject of much litig·ation, especially in regard to whether 
a tax on a corporation is an excise tax or a property ta."'<. 
If the tax is directly on property itself, the tax is a prop-
erty tax but a t.ax is an excise tax rather than a property 
tax where it is not a tax on property as such, but upon cer-
tain kinds of property, having reference to their origin and 
their intended use.'' 
vVe have a tax on automobiles based on use, a license tax,. 
but it is practically for all intents and purposes a tax on 
the car itself, altboug·h it is based on use and that is the 
basis of it; it is a license tax. 
'' Another thing to be noted, it has been said, is that the 
obligation to pay an excise is based upon the voluntary ac-
tion of the person taxed in perf orrn.ing- the act' '.-one of 
the peculiar things a.bout a.n excise tax or a license tax or a 
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privilege tax is "that the obligation to pay an excise is 
based upon the voluntary action of the person taxed in per-
forming the act, enjoying· the privilege or engaging in the 
occupation which is the subJect of the excise, and the ele-
ment of absolute non-avoidable dema~s/in the case of a 
property tax, is lacking.'' 
page 87 ~ No:w it seems to me that sets up a very prac-
ticable, workable, sensible, logfoal, rational rule. 
Here is a man who owns a lot of land tha.t adjoins one that 
has a building on it, but he doesn't use his land, doesn't use 
the sewer; the next one has a residence on it, the third is a 
vacant lot. The house is taxable with the sewer tax because 
he chooses to and does actually use the sewer. Now the 
lot without any improvement on it is not assessable or taxable 
with the sewer because he does not use the sewer and we 
can only impose it where there is use. Now when one vol-
untarily uses his property in such a manner as to incur 
liability, hasn't he determined that he will exercise a privi-
leA"e? Isn't tha.t a license? Doesn't . the :City say to him, 
''You can use our sewer if you pay this tax.'' Doesn't 
it sa.y to him that, "If you don't use it and don't choose to 
use it, there is no way we can make you use it and no way 
we can assess this tax.'' That is what the .Supreme Court 
of Appeals told us in the Southern Railway case. The rule 
now is that the tax is only assessable where the use is made 
of the sewer. It is not a tax upon the property. The Board 
of Assessors can't g·o around there and say that this land is 
worth so much and should .be assessed with a sewer tax; they 
have got to ,find out whether or not there is actual use, and 
that was the problem that Mr. Saville had to solve 
page 88 ~ in determining whether in his opinion the 1939 
and '40 taxes here were wrong· and should be re-
lieved and that is what he meant when he sa.id ·he examined 
those cards and considered the character of the taxes. The 
Court of Appeals told him he had to find out whether there 
was a.ctual use or not, to find out w11ether or not the prop-
erty owner was voluntarily submitting himself to the lia-
bility, and that. is all that license tax was and that is the pe-
culiarity and characteristic of them, that they are assessed 
where one voluntarily comes in and says, "I want the privi-
. le~·e and am willing· to pay what the law says I shall pay." 
l\fr. Florance: Aren't we talking about a case where there 
was no voluntarv use and where the citv has collected the, 
money and we a1:e trying- to get it back because there was no 
voluntary use? 
l\fr. Miller: Yes, but I am saying that as far as the cate-
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gory of the tax itself is ~oncerned it is a license tax and I 
q~m~~cle th~.t the 1938 tax was erroneous, but the point is 
that the ~tatute of· limitations does not' give you any relief 
because the statute of liinitati01is here I say should be held 
is the pp.e· a:pplica~le to license taxes, fix.eel at one year. 
' The ·court: 'Do· ·you know the section of the· code that is 
applicable if a rai1roacl company· is dissa tisfiecl 
pag~ 89 ~ with q1e assessment placed on its property ·by the 
. ' . . . Porporation Conn~iission? 
Mr. Mill~r: I beFeve they have two remedies, one, to g·o 
~ef9i·c the C9rporation O~~rinission and the other to go be-
f9re any G91."!-rt ~f the C~tnity' or city ·in whic.h the land lies. 
+Ve a~~~ssn~ent. is 'reported qy the Commission to the Com-
riussioner of the Revenue and the Commissioner of the Reve-
ime a~tually 1imk~s 'tl1e assessment and I think the Corpora-
tion Conimission · has the power to correct an assessment 
~gainst public service companies, but there is an alternative 
rQµ1~dy of goi11g directly to a court of 1~ecord. · 
· Now in the ca.se of Hun:ton v. Commonwea.lth, 166 Va. 229, 
d~cideq by :the Court of Appeals in 1936,, the court was con-
sidering th~ character of the income tax. One of the ques-
tions ·was the character of the t.ax and it was strenuously 
arid seriously argued that it was· a tax ripon the property 
from which the income was derived. The Commonwealth took 
the po.si'tion it was ah income tax, that it was not a properly 
tax, hor ,,1as it an inl1erita.nce tax, that it was a peculiar kind 
cf a fax; it was ~ot a tax upon the property from which the 
in~ome ,yas d~rived, although there was a. burden upon the 
property by reason of the assessment of the ta.x. The ca.se 
involved the taxing of public s~rvice company divi-
page 90 ~ dencls. The public service company paid no in-
. come ·tax and it was thought the dividends were 
taxable. The State so ruled and the stockholders contended 
t.liat. tl1e constitution exempted 'them because they' paid a 
fr;.-inchisc- tax based on gross receipts and they therefore said 
where tlrn property was taxed no further property tax should 
be asses·sed, and in discussing that they considered some of 
the va.rious ldncls 'of taxes. and I would like to · read Your 
H~11or SOD'l~ of tho~e quotations at page 244, vol. 166: 
"In Com,. v. Carter we held that an inheritance tax is not 
a tax' upori the p1~operty transf efred from the estate of de-
ceclept. tq the bene:ftciar::, but a privileg-e tax, ~nd yet it cer-
~~inly aff e~ts the property transferred.'' 
Now vou will find in tlle statute of the Tax Code that the 
•• ' ... • ' ,, ' • t• 
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inheritance tax is a tax lien upon the property. You have 
a lien there prescribed by statute against the property; Sec-
tion 109 of the Tax Code of Virginia: '' All property ac-
quired shall be charged with a lien for all taxes and inter-
est thereon.'' It is nothing unique in the tax system of Vir-
ginia to make a lien on the property, even tl10ugh it is a privi-
lege ta..-x.. There is the inheritance tax, definitely and finally 
and completely held by the Court of Appeals to be a privilege 
tax, not a property ta.x, and yet it certainly affects 
page 91 ~ the property transferred. 
"In Com. v. Bibee Grocery C01npany we held that a li-
cense tax was not a tax on the property. How could it be 
claimed that it does not affect the property whieh is used 
in the business ? 
"In C01n. v. TV erth we held that a license tax, though grad-
uated according to the amount of income, was not an income 
ta.x, i. e., a tax on the income affected. 
"'l'he owner of an auti)mobile in Virginia pays a. tax for 
the privilege of opera.ting his car. In a sense this tax a.f-
fects the c.a.r, hut it is universally conceded that this is a li-
cense or privilege tax and not a tax on the property con-
cerned, to-wit : the automobile. 
'' And so we think in the final analysis, that the income 
tax here under review is a.n excise tax and not a tax on the 
property from which it is derived." 
I cite that case, of course, only for the purpose of show-
ing that the Court of Appeals has said that a privilege tax 
creating a lien on the property involved is not a property tax; 
it is a privileµ;e tax. 
:M:r. Hazelgrove: Did tllat case g·o to the Supreme Court 
of the United States? 
Mr. Miller: No, there wasn't any Federal question in it. 
There was a re-hearing· granted and the opinion I 
page 92 ~ read was the opinion on the re-hearing. The first 
opinion held to the contrary. By the way, I believe 
,Judge Epes was writing that opinion in his office when he died, 
a.bout 150 some page~ in t]1e first opinion. 
Now all that I think can be definitelv said tha.t this is in 
the natme of a license ta.x and withiii the meaning of the 
words '' license tax'' of section 414 it is a license tax. One com-
pelling· argument is tha.t is the only way you can get any re-
lief. If it is a property tax, there is a lack of uniformity. The 
other point is t]rnt it is for the exercise of a pl'ivileg·c vol-
untarily assumed and taken by the property owner himself. 
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There is nothing the City can do to compel him to pay this 
tax; he bas got to himself ask for and seek and enjoy a privi-
lege, a right, an exercise of a privilege and the exercise of 
the right, and that is all that a license is. He g·ets a license 
to use the sewer. It is not a ,business license, of course, but 
it i8 a license. If. there is no way to classify this as a license 
tax, then one who hang·s a sign in the street and pays a tax. 
for th~ privilege of hanging that sign in the street is not 
enjoying- a l.ieem~e because he is not conducting· a business. 
If one who enjoys the privilege of building and using· an 
area under the street sidewalk does not enjoy a license or a 
piivilege, there is no statute affording that person relief 
from erroneous assessment. If one who hangs 
page 93 ~ his balcony over the sidewalk or awning over the 
sidewalk is not enjoying a license, there is no way 
to give l1im any relief. Yet, if it is a license tax, Section 414 
is broad enoug·h to enable him to come into this court and get 
the relief he should have. This court has authority to grant 
relief as to all license taxes, speoirfieally related to local li-
censt~ taxes, and I submit that this is nothing but in the na-
tm:e of a license tax and if it is a license tax then Section 
41.4 plaiuly limits it to one year, which would exclude the 
19:1~ as8e~snwnt, and the City concedes the 11939 and '40 as-
S€:S:·m1enh, are erroneous and has no objection to the relief 
asked for those two years. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: Has the City afforded the taxpayer re-
lief of the 1939 tax except those filing the petition, asking 
for relieff Has there been universal relief or onlv to those 
applying for it f · 
Mr. Miller: Of course, it was not universal relief, but the 
relief does not have to be universal. There are manv er-
roneous assessments which do not seek relief. There is no 
way in tbe world to argue b~cause the relief is not unifor1n 
because there are many erroneous assessments that are never 
sought to be corrected-
page 94 ~ Mr. Hazelg·rove: I just wanted to question the-
City's altruism, that, they don't give anything to 
anvbodv wl10 doesn't ask for it. 
Mr. ~Miller: They are not that altruistic, no, sir. 
The Court: I want to ask Mr. Saville a question. 
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ROBERT L. SA VILLE, 
being recalled to the stand, testified as follows : 
Bv the Court: 
"Q. In regard to public service corporations does your board 
do anything about placing this sewer tax against public serv-
ice corporations T 
A. Yes, sir; we assess the sewer tax on those, but not the 
real estate tax. 
Q. Of course, I know you do not assess the real est.ate, but 
what I am talking about is this sewer tax. Your board does 
do that? 
A. Yes, sir, in the same way as all the others. 
Mr. Miller: Will Your Honor hear me in argument on 
that point? 
The Court : Yes, because the way my mind is 
page 95 } working· it may have an important e:ff ect. 
Mr. Miller: I see the importance of it and wish 
I was better able to answer it. · 
The Court: I will let you answer it in a brief if you want 
to because I am trying to say that is the way my mind is 
working· and it might have an important bearing on this 
case. 
Mr. Miller: As I said in the beginning, the mind of man 
has not devised a perfect system of taxation, but the 1936 
act intended to take all the duties with respect to the land 
books and tl1e assessment of real estate in the City of Rich-
mond and put them in Mr. Sa.ville 's hands. That is what 
in terms the act said: all duties now devolved upon the Com-
missioner of the Revenue with respect to the assessment of 
renl estate and making up the land books in such cities. Now 
let me get one more fact from Mr . .Saville in the record. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Did the Commissioner of the Revenue when he had 
charge of the assessment of the land impose the sewer tax 
assessment T 
pag·e 96 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. Did the Commissioner of Revenue do that 
or was it Urn Department of Fina.nee under Special Assess-
ments? 
A. I think the Commissioner of the Revenue. I am not 
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Robert L. Saville. 
sure about that because I am not very familiar with that proc-
ess, but it was all put upon the land books; all the back land 
books had those records on them. 
Q. If I read you the provision of the ordinance to the ef-
fect that the Comptroller shall appoint a Special .Assess-
ments clerk who shall be an employee of the Department of 
Finance and it shall be his duty to report the taxes to the 
comptroller and to place the bills in the hands of the Collec-
tor of the City taxes, do you still think the special assess-
men ts clerk was an employee of the Commissioner of the 
Revenue¥ 
A. He was under the Commissioner of the Revenue in writ-
ing the hills. 
Q. He is the one that made the sewer tax assessments 1 
A. Yes, sir, he is the person and the office and the records 
of which came into our office. 
Q. Dicln 't the Comptroller and the Department of Fina.nee 
make the assessment of the sewer tax and not the Comm.is~ 
sioner of. the Revenue! 
A. I suppose he did. 
page 97 ~ 
Mr. Florance: May I ask one question? 
The Court: Yes. 
By Mr. Florance: 
Q. Mr. Saville, after the Corporation Commission has fixed 
the value of the real estate of a railroad, who makes out the 
tax bill! 
A. Our office makes out the tax bill. 
Q. Yon take their valuation and make out the bill for the 
railroad tax Y 
A. Yes, and add the sewer tax to it; there is a specific place 
for it exactly as the other is calculated. 
By the Court: 
Q. But you make out the sewer tax irrespective of any-
thing that the Corporation Commission may put. upon the 
real estate T 
A. That is rig·ht. 
Witness stood aside. 
.J -
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Mr. Miller: Now, if Your Honor please, I submit there 
is a distinction between the assessment of real estate and 
the preparation of the land books and it is entirely con--
sistent for the Board of Assessors to assess sewer taxes 
against public service c.orpora.tions and· not to assess the 
property of the public service corporation, but to prepare 
the land books so that they will show the bill against the 
railroad payable for the property tax assessed by the Cor-
poration Commission and the sewer tax assessed 
page 98 ~ by the special assessments clerk of the Board of 
Real Estate Assessors, and we are not violating 
the enabling act in doing that because the enabling act trans-
ferred to this board all the duties of the Commissioner of 
the Revenue in respect to the assessment of property and 
the preparation of the land books. The Commissioner of 
the Revenue never 11ad the authority to assess sewer taxes, 
never did assess sewer taxes. The ordinance directs that the 
Finance Department shall make out and prepare and de-
termine those bills and assess them, but it has always been 
the practice to put the sewer tax assessments on the land 
books and the land books prior to 1938 were in the office of 
the Commissioner of the Revenue. The assessment of sewer 
taxes is not in the Commissioner of the Revenue. hut in the 
Board of Real Estate Assessors, directly transferred by war-
rant of law by the ena.bling act. The enabling a.ct did not 
say, "You have got to change the met.hod of assessment of 
sewer taxes;" it simply said, "You have authority to change 
the method of preparing the land books,'' and that is all that 
the Board of Assessors does in that respect.. 
The Court: :M:r. Hazelgrove, I would like to ask you a 
question. Suppose your client were a public. serv-
page 99 ~ ice corporation and not a. private individual, how 
would you seek the relief that you are seeking here 
for the individual? 
Mr. Hazelgrove : I would proceed under Section 414 of 
the Tax Code just as we have proceeded because I think this 
is a review for specific relief, just as if the City had con-
templated and constructed a sidewalk in front of the Union 
Station on West Broad Street-
The Court: In other words, you think section 414 applies 
to t correction of erroneous assessments in regard to pub-
Ii ervice corporations just as much so as to individuals 1 
:Mr. Hazelgrove: :For erroneous assessments, yes, sir, I 
certainly do. 
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. Now I cannot agree with Mr. Miller that if this is a li-
cense tax or is not a real estate tax, then there is no method 
by which we can get relief. My understanding of the law 
is this, and my friend Mr. Zimmer may differ with this, ibut 
where a person voluntarily pays a tax he cannot recover 
it back except pursuant to a statute that gives you the right 
to recover it back, but if he- has involuntarily paid the tax 
under duress, then he can recover it back regardless of any 
limitation there mav be in t.he statute. Now he 
page 100 ~ is held to have voluntarily pa.id the tax when a 
method is prescribed of contesting that tax. If 
no method is prescribed of contesting the ~' he has invol-
untarily paid it under coercion and duress and he can re-
cover it back without limitation. I think the cases will bear 
that out. 
The Court: I will be interested in your answer to the 
question because suppose the man has not paid the tax at 
all and the City tries to collect the tax, what then? 
Mr. Hazelgrove : He can contest it. I am ref erring only 
. to where he has actually paid it. 
The Court: In other words, you migl1t get an injunction 
to stop them from collecting it. 
Mr. Hazelgrove: He can do it by perhaps a motion to 
quash the levy, if there has been a levy made, or if the suit is 
brought be. of course, has his day in court. He has a variety 
of remedies and in a. proper case it might be an injunction,. 
if there is grounds for that extraordinary relief if they 
threaten some irreparable damage by virtue of the levy, pre-
venting him from selling his property, etc. 
In this case I think these taxes were volun-
page 101 ~ ta rily paid. The ref ore, I think the statutory 
remedy, wl1icl1ever may be the statute, controls, 
thoug·h there are some cases that state an assessment under· 
a void statute you can go back indefutitely, but. I don't follow 
that line- of cases and I think we are controlled here by one 
statute or the other. Therefore, I think Your Honor must 
say, as I am sure you will say because your interpretation 
will he an interpretation which wiII appear to be most rea:-
sonable and not malrn the tax unconstitutional, that therefore 
it is a real estate1 tax or it is a license tax. 
Now I say to Your Honor a cardinal rule of interpreting 
tax statutes is that that interpretation will be adopted that 
is reasonable and hv reasonable I mean the unconstitu-
tionalitv of the statute. I say to Your Honor if this is a 
license 'tax, a. pure license tax,· then it is unconstitutional be-
cause it discriminates and because there is no re-asonable 
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ha sis for the assessment of the tax. Take, for example, 
Monroe Terrace, an apartment house in the City of Richmond 
with a frontage which I would estimate to be 75 feet. They 
pay a sewer ta.x of $7.50. There are probably more thau 
two hundred toilets in that building connected with the sani• 
tary sewer of the City of Richmond.. Now we take a bungalow 
in the suburbs with one toilet and it pays $7.50 sewer tax. 
Now if it is a license for the use of the sewer, it 
page 102 ~ is plainly unconstitutional as forming· no basis 
whatsoever for the life of the license, but if it is 
a tax on the real estate then, of course, in apportioning taxes 
and special benefits there must be some basis, and I think 
that the particular front foot basis on the length of the 
sewer it takes to go by that property is the fair basis, so you 
can indulge in some hard cases that might appear to make 
that inequitable, but bearing in mind the tax must be appor-
tioned throughout the entire area. I think that is a perfootly 
fair ·basis if it is a tax on the real estate for a peculiar benefit 
accruing to that real estate and the sewer must run by the 
real estate, but if it is a. license ta.."{ there is no basis for the 
classification whatsoever with a :person with two hundred 
toilets or perhaps the Central Na.t10nal Bank-I don't know 
how ma.ny toilets t.ha.t building has to a man with one toilet, 
each paying $7.50. It is absurd and Your Honor will hav(' 
to say the tax on improved property is unconstitutional and 
knowing Your Honor does not want to do that and we do 
not ask you to do it, unless you sa:y it is a license tax. 
And I say in addition to that, ii Your Honor please, that 
the interpretation asked for by the City Attorney makes the 
ordinance creating this Board of Assessors unconstitutional 
because it denies protection of the law to the citi-
page 104 ~ zens of the City or Richmond. Now prior to the 
enactment of the 19:36 statute real estate was as-
sessed every four years. Well, that was perhaps unfair to 
the taxpayer; he had to sit by during those £our years, thoug·h 
llis property might have chang·ed; there might have been a 
radical change in the character of the neig·hborhood. The 
City might have suffered from inequalities of taxation ·be-
cause of the chang·e of the character of the neig·hborhood; 
it might have changed overnight. from residential by virtue 
of the zoning· laws into business and a $30.00 a front foot 
lot into a $150.00 per foot lot. That very frequently has hap-
pened in the City of Richmond, as my friend Mr. Saville 
knows, by virtue of the changes in the zoning laws and both 
11a rties were made to suffer by the fact that tlrn tax system 
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was inelastic and did not meet those sudden changes. So 
the City of Richmond says, "We will change it, we will have 
a board and you can get it assessed every year, a good thing 
for the taxpayer and a good thing for the City of Richmond, 
.and we are going· to prescribe a method by which you can 
contest. their appraisal.'' 
Reasonable men might differ, but read the ordinance and 
every word in it is an opportunitv to the taxpayer to con-
test what 1 To contest the appraisal they put on the prop-
erty. That, is what that ordinance was designed for. "The 
· . 4.ssessors, in performing the duties preseribed 
page 105 ~ in this ordinance, shall have authority to summon 
taxpayers or thci r agents, or any person, to fur-
nish information relating to real estate of any and all tax-
payers and to summon taxpayers or fueir agents or any per-
son to answer under oath,. all questions touching the owner-
ship and value of real estate." That is what they would 
conduct their hearings on and then there is the appeal allowed 
in the 1936 statute to the courts of the Commonwealth or to 
this court of the ·City of Richmond where you may contest 
their values and I say in view of the benefit conferred on 
the citizens of the City of Richmond and the benefit con-
ferred on the municipality itself that you don't have to wait 
every four years for the re-assessment period, yon can do 
it annually. If the character of your property is changing, 
it is perfectly constitutional as affording a reasonable basis 
for classification in Richmond, the capital of our State and 
the largest city. That is reasonable, but did the legislature 
intend to say to the citizens of the City of Richmond if there 
is a void and unconstitutional tax in Lynchburg they have 
two years, but if it is in Richmond you have only one year¥ 
"'\Ve say no, that statute never contemplated this situation, 
never contemplated a void and unconstitutional tax. It con-
templated only a difference of opinion as to the value of 
property a.nd a liberal method set up for testing 
page 106 ~ the value of that property. They have been 
given the right of subpoena llitCes· tecum. You 
know if you were to go to the Board of Assessors and say 
this is unconstitutional they would have a perfect rig·ht to 
la.ugh you out of the office. That wasn't contemplated nor 
was it eontemplatecl that the City of Richmond should be 
penalized and given a less favorable position than that of 
other cities in the State. Thev were all left where thev were 
under Section 414 of the Tax~ Code whieh treats all alike. 
We sav to Your Honor this is not a license tax. Takino· 
. ~ 
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the code of the ,City of Richmond, compiled and revised by 
Mr. McC. G-. Finnigan, a distinguished attorney from this city, 
under the supervision of the City Attorney, and turn to the 
index and look under real estate and you will find sewer tax, 
look under licenses and you will not find sewer tax. That 
is the City Attorney's own index. You won't find sewer 
taxes there. The sewer tax is not a license. 
The Court of Appeals has denominated the tax in the 
Southern Railway case that way in order to arrive at the de-
cision municipalities have no inherent power to levy assess-
ments for local improvements, and that is what it is, an 
assessment for local improvements, and they proceed to dis-
cuss it and show that Section 170 of the constitution, which 
is headed '' Assessments for local improvements,'' 
page 107 ~ -that is the section under which the City of 
Richmond proceeds, yet they say no, we are not 
under that; we are under the licensing· section. We say to 
Your Honor just as plain as can be this is a real estate tax, 
a hurden on the real estate. You can enforce the inheritance 
tax which is a tax on the property inherited and we all know 
the rapidity with which estates are depleted once they get 
in possession and had it not been made a lien and the duty 
of the executor to pay it, it is doubtful if the state could col-
lect it. 
Of course, we realize there are taxes you can make a lien, 
but look at the basis of this tax. Read the ordinance of the 
City and Section 170 of the constitution, the authority of the 
City of Richmond giving them the right to tax real estate 
for local improvements and the Southern Railway case, and 
Your Honor cannot escape the conclusion that this is an as-
sessment for local improvements and an assessment on thJ 
owner for local improvements and a tax on the real estate 
with the limitation controlled bv 414 of the Tax Code. 
Mr. Florance: If Your Honor please, I want to call at-
tention to a few things, if I may. I would be g-lad to put it 
in a written memorandum or do it orally. 
page 108 ~ The Court: I would rather have it in a writ-
ten memorandum. 
Note: Counsel for the petitioner was given until Octo-
ber 1st to submit his written memorandum, a copy to be 
furnished the counsel for the defendant, and the def enda.nt 
was given until October 15th to submit its reply. 
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page 109 ~ JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, Richard T. ·wnson, Judge of the Hustings Court of the 
City of Petersburg, Virginia, being the Judge who presided 
at the trial of the case of H. T. Eubank v. City of Richmond 
in the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, at Richmond, 
Virginia, on the 18th of September, the 14th and the 19th of 
November, 1940, do certify that the foregoing is a true and 
correct copy and report of all the evidence, together with all 
of the motions, objections and exceptions on the part of the 
respective parties, and the action of the Court with respect 
thereto, the memorandum opinion of the Court, the stipula-
tion of counsel as to the use of exhibits, and all other inci-
dents of the trial of the said case. 
And I further certify that the counsel for the petitioner, 
H. T. Eubank, was given reasonable notice in writing by 
counsel for the City, of the time and place when the foregoing 
report of the said record would be tendered to me for signa-
ture and authentication, and I do further certify, that said 
report was presented to me on the 15th day of January, 1941, 
which is within sLxty days from the entry of the final judg-
ment in said case. 
Given under my hand this 15th day of January, 1941. 
RICHARDT. "\VILSON (Seal) 
.Judge of the Hustings Court of the City 
of Petersburg, Virginia, presiding for 
the Judge of the Hus tings Court of 
the City of Richmond. 
page 110 ~ And at the same Hustings Court, to-wit; on the 
· day hereinbefore first written, being the 15th day 
of January, 19f 1, the following order was entered, 
H. T. Eubank, Petitioner 
v. 
City of Richmond, Defendant. 
This day appeared the defendant, by counsel, and tendered 
to the Court a copy of all evidence and proceedings had in 
the above styled cause, which is received, signed and sealed 
by the Court and hereby made a part of the record in this 
cause. 
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page 111 } Virginia : 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond 
H. T. Eubank, Petitioner 
v. 
City of Richmond, Defendant. 
STIPULATION. 
81 
It is hereby stipulated and agreed between the parties 
hereto, by counsel, that the exhibits introduced during the 
trial of this case need not be copied as a part of the record 
and that all such exhibits in this case shall be certified by the 
Clerk of the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond and 
shall be subject to production and use in the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia as provided by law. 
CITY OF RICHMOND. 
By HORACE H. EDWARDS, 
City Attorney. 
H. T. EUBANK. 
By GUY B. HAZELGROVE, 
His Counsel. 
page 112 ~ I, Thos. R. Miller, Deputy Clerk of the Hust-
ings Court of the City of Richmond, Richmond, 
Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy 
of the report of the testimony, together with all the motions, 
objections and exceptions on the part of the respective par-
ties, the action of the Court with respect thereto, and all 
other incidents of the trial of the case of H. T. Eubank, Pe-
titioner, v. City of Richmond, Defendant, in said Court, in the 
said City of Richmond, Virginia, and that the originals thereof 
and copy, together with the original exhibits therein referred 
to, duly authenticated by the presiding Judge of the said 
Court, were lodged and filed with me as Deputy Clerk of said 
Court, on the 15th day of January, 1941. 
Given under my hand on this the 17th day of January, 1941. 
THOS. R. MILLER, 
Deputy Clerk of the Hustings Court of the 
City of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia. 
page 113 } I, Thos. R. Miller, Deputy Clerk of the Hustings 
Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate tran-
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script of the record in the case of H. T. Eubank, Petitioner v. 
City of Richmond, Defendant, lately determine in said Court: 
and I do further certify that counsel of record for the said 
Petitioner had due notice of the intention of counsel for the 
Defendant to apply for said transcript before the same was 
made out and delivered. 
Given under my hand on this the 17th day of January, 1941. 
THOS. R. MILLER, 
Deputy Clerk of the Hustings Court of the 
City of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia. 
Cost of this transcript. No charge. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. "\V ATTS, C. C. 
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